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Abstract 
The research investigates the market and policy conditions that inhibit energy efficiency in 
the household sector in the context of the CDM undermining its financial and 
environmental performance and creating uncertainties in the CDM project financing. The 
contribution to the practical illustration of the uncertainty impact on the project 
performance is undertaken by the economic and barrier analyses and building of the 
alternative performance scenarios for the CDM project on Energy Conservation and 
Greenhouse Gases Emissions Reduction, implemented in the Republic of Moldova. The 
present study contributes to an evaluation of the possible consequences of the market and 
policy conditions for the ex-post results of the project compared to its development 
scenario constructed ex-ante. The research confirmed the relevance of addressing the 
market and non-market conditions at the preparation stage of the CDM project cycle to 
minimize the negative consequences of their fluctuations for the project’s financial and 
environmental results. The study proposes some solutions to reduce the uncertainties in the 
CDM project financing and contributes to closing the gap in the knowledge on the real 
performance of small-scale CDM energy efficiency and fuel switch projects in public 
buildings. The findings of the research can be used during the project design stage in order 
to take into account possible obstacles and benefits that may influence further project 
performance and ensure the project against underperformance. Further research on both 
real performance and methodological implications is needed for gaining better 
understanding of how the CDM energy efficiency in household sector can be further 
developed in the conditions of risk and uncertainty to its possible achievement of pre-
designed financial and environmental goals. 
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Executive Summary 
The purpose of the research is to contribute to understanding of what staeps could be 
undertaken in order to minimize the market and policy conditions that inhibit increased 
energy efficiency in the household sector on the ex-ante financial and environmental 
performance of the CDM projects, by examining a case study on energy efficiency and fuel 
switch in public buildings in Moldova. 
During the research literature was examined to gain a better understanding of the market 
and policy implications for energy efficiency and CDM and identify which are relevant in 
the context of the considered CDM project. Empirical data was collected from the 
stakeholders of the CDM project on Energy Conservation and Greenhouse Gases 
Emissions Reduction in Moldova for the practical illustration of the uncertainty impact on 
the project performance through the economic and barrier analyses and building of the 
alternative performance scenarios for the Moldova CDM project. The contribution of this 
research consists of an analysis of a number of most common barriers to the financial and 
environmental performance of an energy efficiency and fuel switch project in public 
buildings, with the view of its participation in CDM; and an evaluation of the possible 
consequences for the ex-post results of the project compared to its development scenario 
constructed ex-ante. The main focus of the study was on the rebound effects associated 
with the suppressed energy demand and split incentive in the public buildings, market price 
fluctuations and transaction costs. 
Th CDM project on energy efficiency and fuel switch in public buildings was taken as an 
illustrative example of an additional project in a sector rarely approved for participation in 
the CDM. This fact involves an interesting from the research point of view discussion of 
using the CDM as means to overcome significant barriers in implementation of the energy 
efficiency projects, especially in the public buildings. At the same time energy efficiency 
and fuel switch projects face a number of barriers and risks which are not always taken into 
account during the project design. Some barriers are specific to the public buildings, which 
justifies the choice of the illustrative case study for the present research. The findings of the 
research can be used during the project design stage in order to take into account possible 
obstacles and benefits that may influence further project performance and ensure the 
project against underperformance. 
CDM is a very young mechanism and there is still need for more experience and 
knowledge about the risks and uncertainties in the CDM projects. The more projects enter 
the pipeline, the more lessons are learned about how to handle these risks. The research 
confirmed relevance of addressing market and non-market conditions at the preparation 
stage of CDM project cycle to minimize negative consequences of their fluctuations for the 
project’s financial and environmental results. The study proposes some methods to reduce 
the uncertainties in CDM project financing and contributes to closing the gap in the 
knowledge on the real performance of small-scale CDM energy efficiency and fuel switch 
projects in public buildings. 
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1 Introduction and background 
1.1 Historical background 
The growing concerns of the scientific world and general public about the environment and 
mankind’s impact on the global climate pushed for bringing these issues on the political 
agenda. In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established to 
provide scientific advice to the policymakers. In 1990 the IPCC consisting of leading 
scientists and experts published the First Report concluding that anthropogenic emissions 
add to the global greenhouse effect and warm the Earth’s climate (UNEP, 2004a).  
In May, 1992 as a result of negotiations on an international framework convention 
addressing the problem of global warming, the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was completed. It was opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro and entered into force in 1994. The UNFCCC divides the Parties into two 
groups: Annex I (developed industrialized countries) and non-Annex I (primarily, 
developing countries). The Annex I Parties take the obligations to reduce their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions to the level of the reference year (1990) by 2000 (WWF, 2006).  
At the time of adoption of UNFCCC the international negotiations started on the long-term 
emission caps for the Annex I countries beyond year 2000, which resulted in adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol at the Conference of Parties (COP) 3 of the UNFCCC in Kyoto in 
December, 1997.  It sets the emission reduction goal for the Parties over a period 2008-
2012 as an average of 5% below their emissions in the reference year (1990). On the 
individual, country-by-country basis the targets are different, e.g. Japan is obliged to reduce 
its emissions by 6% below the level of 1990, while Iceland can increase its emission by 
10% over its 1990 reference level. These targets reflect the geographical over- and 
underproduction of the GHG emissions, while the common goal is set to achieve “safe 
levels” of the GHG emissions. Kyoto Protocol also defines six GHG which should be 
targeted: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), leaving it up to the 
Parties to choose which of those to address in the national strategies (WWF, 2006).  
The instruments through which the targets can be cost-effectively achieved are also 
introduced by Kyoto Protocol. They give flexibility to the obliged Parties in achieving their 
Kyoto targets. Using different instruments allows the Annex I countries to reduce 
emissions wherever it is least costly and then count these reductions toward their target. 
Kyoto Protocol establishes the following flexible instruments (UNEP, 2004b): 
• Article 6 - International Emission Trading allows countries to trade their carbon 
emission allowances among them, transferring surplus of allowances from one 
country to cover excessive emissions in the other country; 
• Article 12 - Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the emission reduction 
projects located in developing countries and assisting in the achievement of 
sustainable development to generate certified emission reductions (CERs) which 
can be used by investors to comply with their emission cap; 
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• Article 17 - Joint Implementation allows emission reduction projects located in an 
industrialized country transfer achieved emission reductions to the investor country 
for both to comply with their emission limits stipulated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
After adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiations continued to develop a set of rules 
and procedures to follow when aiming at compliance with the Kyoto targets. In 2001 at 
COP 7 the Marrakesh Accords were adopted, which set the modalities and procedures for 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2005 the Kyoto Protocol came into force 
following its ratification by the Russian Federation in 2004 (WWF, 2006).  
1.2 Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
IPCC Third Assessment Report published in 2001 contains the scientific discussion of the 
climate change phenomenon, its causes and effects. The report created a scientific 
consensus about the issue of the global warming. The causes of the phenomenon are known 
to be both natural and anthropogenic, the latter being the largest contribution to the 
emission of the greenhouse gases which are the main reason for the climate alteration 
(IPCC, 2001). 
In 2007 the Working Group III contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report was 
published. It provides the development of different scenarios for the Earth’s climate with a 
view of the existing potential for the greenhouse gas mitigation in different economic 
sectors. The largest potential at the lowest cost (< 100 USD/tCO2) has been identified 
within the buildings sector (see Fig. 1-1). The report enumerates a range of positive aspects 
related to energy efficiency in buildings, both new and existing. Among them, the possible 
reduction of 30% of the GHG emissions in the sector with the net economic benefit. 
However, there are also limitations to implementation of the GHG mitigation projects in 
buildings at a larger scale: financing, policy choices, information and transaction costs, 
availability of technology, limitations of the building designs, etc. The developing world 
experiences these barriers at a higher magnitude than the developed countries (IPCC, 
2007). 
 
Figure 1-1 Estimated greenhouse gas reduction potential by 2030 by sector and cost 
categories 
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Source: Urge-Vorsatz and Novikova, 2008 
With the view of combating the global climate change the Kyoto Protocol was agreed 
between the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997. It addressed 
the issue of cost-effectiveness in mitigating the GHG emissions through adoption of 
“flexible mechanisms”. These mechanisms were also intended to assist developed 
countries in meeting their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. “Flexible mechanisms” create 
a new market for carbon, attracting investments into the GHG mitigation projects, thus 
aiming at solving the problem of project financing and at the same time developing the 
capital market (IETA, 2006). Different countries and regions were adopting various trading 
mechanisms (emission trading schemes, White Certificates, etc.) for achieving their goals 
of the GHG emission reduction at the least possible cost. 
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2 Research question and methodology 
2.1 Background 
CDM has been largely debated as to its achievement of the real emission reductions and a 
secondary goal of sustainability. As an example, the supply of carbon credits is dominated 
by the reduction of the industrial gases, among which HFC-23, which is 11 700 times more 
potent in greenhouse effect than CO2. HFC-23 is a by-product of the refrigerant gas HFC-
22. Projects that reduce HFC-23 generate enormous amounts of CERs, due to its high 
potency as a greenhouse gas. This fact makes such projects extremely attractive for the 
investors, while the cost of mitigation is very low and revenue from CERs extremely high 
(Wara and Victor, 2008).  
Heller (2007) gives a clear explanation of why HFC-23 reduction is financially attractive in 
the current market conditions. Cost of abatement of HFC-23 is equal to approximately 0.1 
euro/t CO2, while the CER price for 1 kg of HFC-22 is 2.89 euro. At the same time the 
market price for 1 kg of HFC-22 is only 1.6 euro. The fact that revenue from CERs in the 
HFC-23 reduction projects is higher than the profit from production of HFC-22 created an 
incentive for the companies to increase their production of HFC-22. Increase in the 
production of the main product leads to the release of larger amounts of the by-product 
gases, HFC-23 in this case, creating more opportunities to capture this gas in larger 
quantities at low prices and gain CERs for such activity.  The incentive to increase the 
production rather than phase-out the harmful practice is called a perverse incentive. Due to 
the perverse incentive created by the CDM the plants producing refrigerants transformed 
into plants producing CERs with HFC-22 as a by-product. The contribution of such 
projects to the emission reduction is clearly negative. HFC-23 reduction projects do not 
directly contribute to the improvement of people’s living either, thus having no positive 
impact on the sustainable development (Wara and Victor, 2008, Heller, 2007, CAN 
International, 2007). 
HFC-23 is just one example of the projects which do not fulfill the goal of the CDM and 
whose eligibility for this mechanism is questioned. There are also projects which are 
considered eligible while promoting subsidies to the polluting fuels, such as renewable 
energy projects, which would not be profitable compared to the subsidized coal unless 
credited from carbon trading. 
Another issue is so-called “anyway” projects. Such projects would happen without the 
CERs revenue, but are claimed under CDM. An example can be given by the Chinese 
expanding electrification through a variety of sources, such as hydro, wind and natural gas. 
The diversion from coal to other sources is stipulated by the national policy; therefore it is 
logical to assume that such diversification would happen in the sector anyway. However, 
the individual projects in this sector claim CERs revenue marginal for their performance 
(Wara and Victor, 2008). More about it would be discussed in Section 3.2 on additionality.  
The initial design, purpose and justification of the project matter a lot in order to be 
considered eligible for the CDM. The project developers, investors and governments are 
interested in claiming their projects need CERs to be implemented. In some sectors this 
may create perverse incentive, like in the refrigerant gases industry; in others it might lead 
to manipulation with the additionality demonstration (Heller, 2007). 
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On the other hand, there is a multitude of the small-scale projects, which may generate real 
emission reductions and improve the living standards of the people, but they are rarely 
considered eligible. Among these are energy efficiency projects, which usually generate 
savings on their own (Reynolds, 2008).   
The initial design of the project is important for the real performance. However, even if a 
project has been considered compliant with all the CDM requirements, it might become a 
project that will not achieve its goal in the end and will not contribute to the sustainable 
development and the emission reductions. During its implementation the project faces a lot 
of barriers. Its participation in the CDM may be justified for overcoming certain barriers, 
but different constraints have a tendency to change over time and have an impact on the 
project results, which were not assumed in the ex-ante evaluation of the project.  
The biggest uncertainty with CDM lies in its assumptive nature. CERs are issued based on 
a simple calculation of the difference between what might have been emitted if no project 
taken place and what really was emitted after the project had been implemented. In the 
project design, however, the project emissions are also estimated, raising uncertainty. Thus, 
the actual project performance evaluated ex-post may be different from what was expected 
in ex-ante evaluation of the project results. The discrepancy between the estimated and the 
actual performance may affect the project’s contribution to sustainability and the overall 
reasonability of the project implementation. 
2.2 Research purpose and questions 
The purpose of my research is to contribute to understanding of what could be done in 
order to minimize the market and policy conditions that inhibit increased energy efficiency 
in the household sector on the ex-ante financial and environmental performance of the 
CDM project, by examining a case study on energy efficiency and fuel switch in public 
buildings in Moldova. 
My research questions I used for structuring my study: 
• How is the performance of the CDM project estimated ex-ante? 
• What market and policy conditions influence the financial and environmental 
performance of the CDM projects on energy efficiency in households? 
• What impact do these market and policy conditions have on the financial and 
environmental performance of the CDM projects on energy efficiency in 
households? 
and finally, 
• What measures can be implemented to address these conditions? 
In order to know what to expect and what issues to address when designing a CDM project, 
a real and operating CDM project on energy efficiency and fuel switch in public buildings 
was taken as an illustrative case study. The choice of the case study is justified by the 
following project characteristics:  
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• It is a project, which satisfies the additionality requirements in the sector (energy 
efficiency in households) rarely applied and approved for participation in the CDM;  
• The project involves an interesting from the research point of view discussion on 
using CDM as means to overcome significant barriers in implementation of the 
energy efficiency projects, while such projects usually face a number of barriers and 
risks which are not always taken into account during the project design.  
• The project addresses the energy efficiency on the supply side at the individual 
level of a household and fuel switch measures. The barriers addressed in the present 
research are common for energy efficiency and fuel switch in households 
(residential and public) and the findings of the study can be partly replicated or 
extrapolated on the other types of energy efficiency projects in households; 
• Some of the barriers for the project are specific to public buildings, which are also a  
vulnerable sector in terms of financial capability to implement projects that go 
beyond business-as-usual; 
• The uniqueness of the project. CDM pipeline includes only 9 projects in energy 
efficiency in buildings, among which only 5 are registered. 2 projects comprise a 
bundle of a large number of buildings. Moreover, only one project is focused on 
fuel switch besides energy efficiency and on public buildings as a target sector 
(Fenhann, 2008); 
• The project has not been studied before and due to its recent commissioning in 
2005 the project’s ex-post performance has not been evaluated yet. 
2.3 Research methodology 
The research is based on the analysis of the on-going Clean Development Mechanism 
project on Energy Conservation and Greenhouse Gases Emissions Reduction implemented 
in the the Republic of Moldova.  
The research has been performed in three steps: 
• Literature review with the examination of the theoretical and practical findings in 
the relevant studies. The review consisted of the examination of the recent studies 
on policy, economic and technical aspects of energy efficiency in buildings, 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, and Clean Development Mechanism. The 
literature review was done for the purpose of understanding of up-to-date scientific 
knowledge about the subject of the research and selecting a range of theoretical 
frameworks and instruments to base the analytical part of the research on: economic 
theory, theory of transaction costs, barrier analysis, and economic analysis.  
• Document review with examination of the case documentation, both country- and 
project-specific, conduction of a range of interviews with the relevant stakeholders, 
site visits. The document review was performed with the view of collecting 
information and empirical data about the project’s ex-ante and ex-post financial, 
environmental and social performance. 
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• Analysis of the case-specific empirical data with application of the theories and 
methods determined during the literature review: building of the alternative 
performance scenarios, cost-revenue and sensitivity analyses. 
The main purpose of this study is to identify a range of the market and policy obstacles to 
the energy efficiency projects in public buildings and assess how they may change the 
project performance indicators. Through the literature review the following barriers have 
been identified: suppressed demand and rebound effects, budgetary constraints and the 
associated split incentive, transaction costs and market risks. Market risks include the 
volatility of the fuel prices and the CER prices. The suppressed demand and the associated 
rebound effects inhibit environmental additionality; budgetary constraints are a general 
barrier to the project implementation, but under certain circumstances, defined in the 
analytical part, can become an obstacle for the social and environmental performance of the 
project; market risks influence the economic profitability of the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Research methodology 
Source: constructed based on Sutter, 2001 
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The empirical data and information about the actual performance of the project has been 
collected from the Energy II Project and Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) Moldova, through the 
personal interviews with Petr Comarov, the energy expert of Moldova Energy II Project 
Implementation Unit (MEPIU), Dumitru Braga, the technical expert of CFU Moldova, 
Stela Drucioc, the director of the CFU Moldova and Jorge Gastelumendi, the Community 
Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) of the World Bank (WB). The interviews were 
conducted using open-ended questions. Interviewees were selected due to their direct 
participation in the CDM project under investigation, ability to provide primary data and 
objective and reliable information regarding the project preparation and its performance 
during the later stages of the CDM project cycle.  
The primary data include:  
• Project activity (PA) information: type of the building, location, current heating 
capacity, installed heating capacity foreseen under the project, type of the current 
fuel, type of the current heat generator (Annex B); 
• Measured data on the fuel use for each PA in 2004 (reference year); 
• Projected emissions and emission reductions for the crediting period; 
• Initial assumptions under the project’s design document for construction of the 
baseline and project scenarios (Annex C); 
• Actual data on the fuel consumption and emission reductions generated by the 
project activities for 2006-2007. 
The analytical part of the research includes the demonstration of the project’s suppressed 
demand and building of the energy consumption scenarios with the incorporated annual 
energy consumption increase due to the rebound effect; building of a scenario reflecting the 
hypothetical changes in the budget and the associated rebound effect; the analysis of the 
project’s financial indicators and the sensitivity analysis against the changes in the fuel 
price and the CER price; building of the scenario reflecting the incorporation of the 
transaction costs into the total cost of the project; the analysis of the project’s actual 
environmental performance. All associated calculations of the variables used for 
construction of the models, scenarios, and performance of the analyses are given in Annex 
D.  
Based on the findings from the analysis of the case study, the conclusions and 
recommendation are made on use of the methods for the uncertainty reduction and 
performance optimization of the CDM energy efficiency projects in households at the 
initial stages of the project development as well as the suggestions for the further research.   
2.4 Scope and limitations 
The research focuses on the application of the CDM to the greenhouse gas mitigation 
through the energy efficiency and fuel switch measures in the household sector, specifically 
public buildings. 
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The geographical scope of the research is Moldova, with possible application of the study 
results to the Former Soviet Union countries with a similar situation in the heating sector.  
The subject of the study is the uncertainty in the CDM financing through evaluation of the 
market and policy conditions and their impact on the CDM project performance from the 
triple bottom line: economic, environmental and social. The analysis of the impacts 
includes both quantitative and qualitative evaluation. 
While there is a multitude of various market, behavioural, policy, technology, etc. 
conditions which inhibit the implementation or performance of the energy efficiency 
projects, also within the CDM, the analysis was limited to a certain number of conditions, 
which were selected according to their particularity to the energy efficiency, CDM and 
public buildings simultaneously, and relevancy for the project under study.  
The research was constrained by the lack of the previous studies, and therefore available 
data on the similar projects in the region; lack of availability of the empirical data for the 
selected categories of the indicators. 
2.5 My contribution 
My contribution consists of an analysis of a number of the most common barriers to the 
financial and environmental performance of an energy efficiency and fuel switch project in 
public buildings, with the view of its participation in the CDM; and an evaluation of the 
possible consequences for the ex-post results of the project compared to its development 
scenario constructed ex-ante. The practical illustration of the barriers’ quantitative impact 
on the CDM project performance is given by the analysis of the on-going energy efficiency 
and fuel switch project in the public buildings in Moldova: a type of project, which has not 
been widely addressed in the literature, but is demanded for its sustainability benefits for 
the developing world. The present research also provides a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the actual results of the CDM project, the ex-post performance of which has 
not been previously evaluated. Based on the findings from the actual project performance 
and modeled scenarios, the research contributes to the understanding of which uncertainties 
in the CDM financing need to be addressed, what impact could be expected and how it 
could be mitigated during the designing stage of the CDM project performance. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 What is CDM 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a flexible instrument which is designed to 
assist developing countries in their achievement of the sustainable development by 
attracting foreign investments in the GHG emission reduction projects through trading of 
the carbon credits.  CDM has been established under the Kyoto Protocol, the main 
requirement of which is for the Parties to limit or reduce the greenhouse gas emissions 
(UNEP, 2004b). 
 
The scientific world agrees that it does not matter where on the Earth the reductions take 
place; therefore it is economically sound to cut the emissions where it costs least.  The 
flexible mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol were designed as market-based 
to achieve this goal. While a number of countries accepted a cap on their emissions under 
the Kyoto protocol, there is a range of countries which are still on their developing path 
and their emissions will be increasing while their economy grows. The flexible 
mechanisms provide for the technology transfer from the developed world to the 
developing countries, helping them achieve the sustainable development and allowing the 
investing countries comply with their obligations under the requirements of the Kyoto 
Protocol (IETA, 2006). 
 
The GHG emission reduction projects implemented under the CDM allow generation of 
the certified emission reductions (CERs) which can be traded in the carbon market and 
used by the investing country to meet its emission reduction target under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Possibility to trade CERs makes the project more financially attractive, creating 
an additional source of revenue. At the same time, the Kyoto Protocol does not exclude 
unilateral projects, where the developing countries are investors themselves (UNEP, 
2004a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 How CDM works 
Source: WWF, 2006 
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3.1.1 CDM organizational structure 
CDM is an instrument which is administered by an organizational structure. It has a 
supervisory body, technical panels and groups, independent consulting/auditing bodies, 
national designated bodies, and project participants.  
The CDM Executive Board (EB) supervises CDM under the guidance of the Conference of 
Parties, which is a meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM EB consists of 
10 members: 1 from each of the 5 official UN regions, 2 from Annex I Parties, 2 from non-
Annex I Parties, and 1 from the island developing states. The EB is responsible for the 
recommendations on the modalities and procedures; development of new methodologies, 
including baseline calculation and monitoring; accreditation of the Designated Operational 
Entities; ensuring public access to the project design documents and discussion of the draft 
methodologies; creation and maintenance of the registry; official registration of the 
approved projects; issuance of the CERs. The EB can organize Panels and Working groups 
(WGs) of experts to base its activities on the accumulated expertise (UNEP, 2004a, WWF, 
2006). 
The CDM Panels and Working groups include (WWF, 2006, IETA, 2006):  
• Methodologies Panel: assesses proposals for the new methodologies;  
• Afforestation and Reforestation WG: develops modalities and procedures for the 
afforestation and reforestation projects;  
• Small-scale WG: develops modalities and procedures for the small-scale projects;  
• Accreditation Panel: manages the accreditation of the DOEs. 
The Designated Operational Entities (DOE) are independent third-party organizations, 
which carry out the validation of the project design and verification and certification of the 
project performance during the use phase. DOE also sends a request for the project 
registration after its validation and issuance of the CERs after the verification and 
certification of the emission reductions. Validation and verification should be performed by 
different DOEs, however, sometimes the EB can accredit one DOE to fulfill both functions 
within one project (IETA, 2006, UNEP, 2004). 
The Designated National Authorities (DNA) are bodies set up at the national level by the 
CDM participants, which can be either the participating countries or private or 
governmental organizations, designated by the participating countries. The role of the DNA 
is to submit the project approval letter, confirming that the project fulfils the basic CDM 
requirements, and namely (WWF, 2006): 
• The party, which DNA represents, ratified the Kyoto Protocol; 
• Participation in the project is voluntary; 
• Project contributes to the sustainable development of the hosting Party.  
Irina Costromitcaia, IIIEE, Lund University 
12 
3.1.2 CDM projects 
CDM as the rest of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is designed to promote 
international investments into environmentally sound technologies. However, focusing on 
the developing countries this mechanism makes the sustainable development an eligibility 
criterion when applying for the CDM. By promoting projects which improve all three 
bottom-line aspects of the Sustainable Development: economic, social and environmental, 
CDM aims at poverty alleviation, improvement of energy supply, less dependence on 
imported fossil fuels, improved air quality, rural development, etc. (UNEP, 2004b). 
The scope of the CDM covers a range of economic sectors, reflected in Annex A to the 
Kyoto Protocol (IETA, 2006; UNFCCC, 2008a):  
• Energy industry (including renewable energy);  
• Energy distribution;  
• Energy demand;  
• Manufacturing industry;  
• Chemical industry;  
• Construction;  
• Transport;  
• Mining and mineral production;  
• Metal production;  
• Agriculture;  
• Fugitive emissions from fuels (fuel switching);  
• Fugitive emissions from the production and consumption of halocarbons and sulfur 
hexafluoride;  
• Used solvent;  
• Waste management;  
• Carbon sinks (afforestation and reforestation). 
Specific baseline and monitoring methodologies were developed for each of the scopes. 
The CDM projects are also divided into large and small scale. The types of the small-scale 
projects focus on the supply and/or demand-side energy efficiency, renewable energy and 
fuel switching. The limits defining the small-scale are set as following (UNEP, 2004a): 
• Maximum 15 MW output capacity for the renewable energy projects; 
• Maximum reduction of the energy consumption by 15 GWh/year for the demand- 
or supply-side energy efficiency projects; 
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• Maximum direct emission of 15 kilotons of CO2 e annually for other projects 
which reduce emissions. 
Small-scale projects are benefitting from the simplified modalities and procedures for the 
demonstration of additionality, baseline calculation and monitoring. The rules for the small 
scale projects are less complicated than for the large scale. In developing countries with a 
lower capacity for the large initial investment small projects may serve as pilots to create a 
pattern for the sustainable development. Environmental integrity, which is considered 
crucial for the CDM projects, may be lost in some small scale projects; therefore rules for 
such projects are less strict on the environmental integrity, while other effects, such as 
social and technological, are more important. Simplified rules reduce transaction costs, 
thus lessen the cost burden on the small-scale projects, which do not generate large 
revenues, making them more competitive (IETA, 2006). 
3.1.3 CDM project cycle 
The first step in a CDM procedure is the project identification. The project description 
constitutes a project design document, which when approved and verified is the basic 
document for the project registration.  
The project should be real, measurable and additional (UNEP, 2004a). The additionality 
criterion is central to the CDM projects and more of explaining the additionality will be in 
the Section 3.2. To demonstrate additionality the project has to establish a measurable 
baseline or an assumed scenario of what would be happening if there was no project. 
Baseline development is also very important for the calculation of the emission reductions 
and therefore of the future potential revenues from the CERs. Thus, it is very important to 
estimate the baseline accurately (Gustavsson et al., 2000). 
The potential project emission reductions also have to be estimated in the project, as well 
as a plan for their monitoring and calculation mode. Both the baseline scenario and the 
monitoring plan are developed according to the methodologies applicable for the specific 
project. For small-scale projects there exist simplified methodologies for the various 
categories of projects.  
After the project design document (PDD) is developed it has to be evaluated and approved 
by the Designated National CDM Authority set up by each participating country. The 
Authorities issue the approval documents, stating voluntary participation of their countries 
in the CDM and the contribution of the project to the sustainable development.  
After the approval the Designated Operational Entity reviews the PDD and decides upon its 
validation. At the end the validation report is issued and the PDD is sent to the Executive 
Board for registration. When the project is officially registered it can be financed and 
implemented. 
The course of the project performance is regularly monitored by the project managers 
according to the monitoring plan. The plan usually includes a list of the necessary records 
to be taken during the monitoring periods. The emission reductions cannot be converted in 
the monetary value unless verified by a third-party. Monitoring reports and field sampling 
is done by the DOE to check the accuracy of the recorded emission reductions and 
application of the methodologies in the PDD. The outcome of this stage is a verification 
Irina Costromitcaia, IIIEE, Lund University 
14 
report produced by the DOE, which also certifies the verified emission reductions as CERs. 
Certification report also contains the request to the EB for issuance of the CERs. If no 
further review of the emission reductions is requested within 15 days, the EB instructs the 
Registry to issue CERs for the given project (UNEP, 2004b, IETA, 2006). 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 CDM project cycle, responsible bodies and document flow 
Source: constructed based on UNEP, 2004a 
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3.1.4 CDM and Energy Efficiency 
All projects requested for registration, at validation or registered form the CDM pipeline. 
The pipeline has been growing since 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol came into force. 
According to the UNFCCC statistical data, the total pipeline includes more than 3000 
projects, of which 1149 are registered. The growth of the registered projects is illustrated in 
the Figure 3-3. According to the UNFCCC report on the investment and financial flows in 
the carbon markets, the investments into the CDM grew from 7 billion USD in 2005 to 25 
billion USD in 2006 (UNFCCC, 2008a; Fenhann, 2008). 
 
Figure 3-3 Accumulated number of registered CDM projects 
Source: Fenhann, 2008 
As of August 2008, the majority of the projects are in energy industries, renewables and 
non-renewables, primarily in China, India and Brazil.  Small scale projects comprise 46.4% 
(533 projects) of the total registered projects. Among which the energy demand projects are 
only 18 (1.23%). Comparing to the total pipeline only 5% are the demand-side energy 
efficiency projects. The demand-side projects include energy efficiency in industry, 
commercial buildings and households. The largest share of the projects belong to industry. 
The share of the projects on EE in households is less than 1%. There are in total 9 EE in 
households projects in the pipeline, among which 5 are registered: 4 in households and 1 in 
a commercial building (hotel) (UNFCCC, 2008a; Umamaheswaran and Michaelowa, 
2006). 
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Figure 3-4 CDM projects by category (%) 
Source: Fenhann, 2008 
The total amount of the CERs expected from the CDM by 2012 is equal to 174 millions. 
The largest share of the issued CERs is in HFCs, PFCs and N2O reductions (73%); for the 
demand-side energy efficiency projects there are no CERs issued yet. EE projects in 
households are not generating CERs yet and the amount expected by 2012 is very low. 
Comparing to the EE in industry the households energy efficiency would generate 24 times 
less CERs by 2012 (1.4 million against 3.3 million) (Fenhann, 2008). Such fact shows that 
although energy efficiency is named by IPCC (2007) a promising sector for the GHG 
mitigation at the lowest cost, it has not realized its potential. While the industry is 
performing much better in the CDM, the household sector is facing barriers to energy 
efficiency. The ability to overcome barriers is tightly connected with the purpose of the 
CDM and incorporated in its modalities and procedures.  
Before relating the CDM and barriers to energy efficiency in households, first I would like 
to discuss one of the main CDM requirements, which can possibly be a reason for the low 
share of the energy efficiency projects in the pipeline. The DOEs reported that over the 
2003-2006 they rejected 369 (18.5%) projects at validation. The EB rejected 70 out of 1381 
projects (Fenhann, 2008). Many of the projects are not registered, because they cannot 
show compliance with the CDM requirements. One of these requirements, the most 
controversial and widely discussed, is demonstration of additionality. By March 2008 17% 
of the projects were rejected because they could not show the investment or financial 
additionality (WB, 2008) 
3.2 Additionality 
Additionality is a central concept in the CDM. On the basis of the additionality criteria the 
projects are selected to use the mechanism. The project is considered additional if it would 
not have happened anyway, without being registered as the CDM. This concept has been 
introduced to preserve the environmental integrity of the CDM (Umamaheswaran and 
Michaelowa, 2006). A simple illustration shows what is meant by the environmental 
integrity. If I am contributing to an increase in CO2 emissions by driving a car, for instance, 
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I can either stop doing this or buy carbon offsets to finance the emission reductions 
somewhere else. If these offsets had been generated from an emission reduction project 
which would not happen without my financing, I truly contributed to the emission 
reduction in some part of the Earth. If the project did not really need my money to be 
implemented, I just subsidized some activity that would have happened anyway (Kollmuss 
et al., 2008). In order not to allow such “business-as-usual” projects as the CDM, the 
additionality principle has been introduced for screening of the projects.  
The project maybe not additional in two cases: if it would happen in the absence of the 
CDM or if it did not generate lower emissions compared to the emission level that would 
happen in the absence of the project. What would happen in the absence of the project is 
called a hypothetical baseline scenario. Thus, first step in demonstrating additionality is to 
prove that some other scenario other than the project is the most probable baseline. For that 
purpose (and other, like the emission reduction calculation), this probable business-as-
usual scenario needs to be identified (Kollmuss et al., 2008; UNIDO, 2003). Development 
of the baseline scenario and additionality cannot exist without each other. As any project 
has economic, environmental and social characteristics, the divergence between these 
characteristics in the most probable and the considered project scenario should be the 
estimation of the project’s additionality.  
Marrakesh Accords, paragraph 43, define additionality as follows: “a CDM project activity 
is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below 
those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity” 
(Yap, 2007). That is if there is any other possible scenario that is generating larger 
emission reductions and is more likely to happen, the project is not additional. The 
statement above shows that it is not enough to show that the given project is different from 
the supposed baseline. It has to be environmentally more attractive than the baseline in 
terms of emission reductions.  
There is a large debate around the additionality definition, importance and necessity of 
having such a concept in the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists, businesses and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have their own opinions on the additionality. In their study of the 
additionality and Sustainable Development of energy efficiency CDM projects, 
Umamaheswaran and Michaelowa (2006) give an overview of opinions of different 
societies. Scientists typically believe that “non-additional projects might grant greenhouse 
gas credits to any ordinary foreign direct investment that uses more efficient technology 
than the one existing in the host country and would lead to the generation of low value 
CERs” (Umamaheswaran and Michaelowa, 2006, p. 12) . Businesses disagree, claiming 
that “in its present form, the additionality tool exposes every project to a highly subjective 
assessment of its CDM eligibility and allows for second-guessing by the EB” 
(Umamaheswaran and Michaelowa, 2006, p. 12). NGOs state that without additionality 
CDM will lose its environmental integrity: “Without additionality, the CDM results in 
increased global emissions and thus the additionality criteria should be strict and the 
enforcement must be effective” (Umamaheswaran and Michaelowa, 2006, p. 12). Most 
studies show that additionality is important for maintaining the Kyoto Protocol’s 
environmental integrity; however, they also argue that too strict additionality rules would 
reduce the number of total CDM projects and the supply of CERs, therefore avoiding a 
decrease in CERs price. This may create a perverse incentive for the countries (Sugiyama 
and Michaelowa, 2001). 
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The process of demonstrating additionality includes a choice among a number of possible 
scenarios. The choice is made based on several factors: economic, technology, regulatory, 
common practice (UNFCCC, 2007a).  
UNIDO (2003) conducted a study “Guidelines to support decision-making on baseline-
setting and additionality assessment for industrial projects”, in which it identifies various 
types of additionality: 
• Environmental additionality – the project generates lower emissions than the 
baseline alternative; 
• Regulatory additionality - the project complies at least with all existing regulations; 
• Technological additionality - project foresees transfer of new and/or innovative 
technology, previously not used locally; 
• Economic additionality - CDM makes a financially unattractive project 
competitive; 
• Barrier removal additionality - participation in CDM removes barriers to project 
activity (investment, technology, information, capacity building, etc.);  
The debate among the negotiating parties resulted in abolishment of the categorization of 
additionality. At the moment the economic additionality concept, largely discussed, is not 
supported by the majority of negotiating parties (Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003). 
A schematic representation of the additionality check process is shown below: 
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Figure 3-5 Process of demonstration of additionality 
Source: Wakabayashi and Sugiyama, nd 
For small-scale projects the simplified procedure of additionality demonstration requires 
only barrier check. Michaelowa (2005) argues that any project faces barriers; thus it is 
important to determine a certain level of barrier impact or threshold for additionality to 
avoid manipulation. Otherwise, the projects, which could overcome barriers without CDM, 
may be considered additional.   
3.2.1 Economic additionality 
Economic additionality (or investment additionality, as called in some studies (Greiner and 
Michaelowa, 2003) and UNFCCC documents (Shrestha and Timilsina, 2002) raised the 
largest debate among the negotiating groups at COP 6 (Ertel and Egelston, 2000). Financial 
additionality, which requires the CDM project not to lead to diversion of the official 
development assistance (ODA) is not discussed in this study (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 
2006).  
At the core of the economic additionality there is a simple assumption that projects, which 
are financially profitable without revenue from the emission reductions, would be 
implemented anyway (Reynolds, 2008). Although this statement looks logical, it provoked 
a lot of opposition from business and even academia. Business is concerned with the fact, 
that some very profitable projects are not implemented anyway due to severe barriers. 
Application of a pure economic additionality criterion to such projects would prevent their 
implementation. Academia raises the argument for the initial design of CDM as a cost-
effective tool in achieving emission reductions. The most economically attractive projects 
would be excluded from CDM if screened through economic additionality. However, these 
projects are also most cost-effective and that is the purpose of CDM as a flexible tool 
(Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003). This paradox, described by Grubb et al. (1998), raised a 
strong objection to economic additionality.  
However, while CDM can become a catalyst to the projects which have low profitability or 
are slightly unprofitable, it is not reasonable to consider any profitable emission reducing 
project for CDM. If no economic additionality is applied, almost any construction plan for 
a coal-fired power plant in a developing country would be capable of gaining CERs 
because it is more efficient than the existing power generating unit (Trexler and Kossloff, 
1998). 
Another problem related to the economic additionality is consideration of macro- and 
sector-scale. An example of the policy impact can be clearly seen in a case of the existing 
subsidies on fossil fuels in a considered developing country. If a proposed renewable 
energy project is economically unattractive/unprofitable compared to a subsidized coal 
plant and therefore additional, in the absence of a subsidy it might become more attractive 
and thus, non-additional. This may create an incentive for the state to continue enforcement 
of fossil fuel subsidies and overall inefficient policy. Greiner and Michaelowa (2003) 
propose in this case to separate micro- and macro-additionality and look into macro-
additionality as a tool for phasing out perverse incentives. 
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Sectoral changes are also an issue when discussing economic additionality. Shrestha and 
Timilsina (2002) argue that sectoral impacts have to be taken into account when addressing 
the economic additionality, not only individual project. In case the planned cleaner coal 
technology is not the least-cost option (over traditional coal-fired technology) it may be 
considered additional and registered under CDM. However, it can be more cost-efficient at 
higher generation rates, and therefore might replace the capacities of existing renewable, 
hydro- or gas-based power plants. This may result in higher emissions than the baseline for 
the whole power sector.  
As it was mentioned before, the biggest concern of the business about the economic 
additionality was the barriers that profitable projects might face in the developing 
countries.  Usually such economies are characterized by a number of investment, financial, 
technical, technological, political, and other barriers which may prohibit the 
implementation of an investment project, even if it is financially attractive (Reynolds, 
2008; Michaelowa and Fages, 1999). Therefore, the additionality test requires an 
explanation of the barriers preventing implementation of a project, and demonstration of 
how CDM helps overcome these barriers (UNFCCC, 2007a).  
Shrestha and Timilsina (2002) propose to look at the projects seeking registration under the 
CDM as two groups: “economically regret” and “economically no regret”. First group is 
financially unattractive, while the second is profitable. The first group is economically 
additional, unless the CDM does not help overcome the cost barrier and makes the project 
not viable even with additional revenue from carbon trading. The second group, however, 
should also be divided into two groups. Shrestha and Timilsina (2002) base this division of 
economically viable projects on the criterion of funding availability. Generally speaking, 
availability of funds is a barrier criterion. If funds are available, then the project does not 
face a financial barrier and can be implemented without additional revenue from the CERs. 
If, on the contrary, there is a lack of access to the funds, the use of the CDM may be 
crucial, making such a project additional. However, if no such individual approach is 
undertaken and only a pure economic additionality criterion is applied, an economically 
attractive, but constrained by the barriers projects would be deemed non-additional and 
excluded from the CDM. It should be noted, that besides the funding barrier there are a 
number of other barriers to investment projects, which may inhibit their implementation. 
This is what usually happens to the demand-side energy efficiency projects. These projects 
generate savings, thus having a positive and sometimes high return on investments. 
However, energy efficiency projects are not widely implemented in developing countries. 
This happens due to a number of general barriers to energy efficiency, like a split incentive, 
information barriers and transaction costs (Koeppel and Urge-Vorsatz, 2007). 
The savings arising from the energy efficiency improvements are usually also affected by 
the rebound effect, and in low-income households by the suppressed demand, which leads 
to the increase in the energy consumption, and therefore emissions. As a result the savings 
are not as big as expected and the project may not be as economically viable as planned 
when not taking these impacts into consideration. For some demand-side energy efficiency 
projects the energy savings have been reduced by as much as 75% due to the rebound effect 
(Shrestha and Timilsina, 2002).   
The availability of funding and rebound effects are not the only barriers a profitable project 
may face. Some studies, such as Michaelowa and Fages (1999) show that there are a 
number of other barriers, such as information barriers, juridical, regulatory and political 
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obstacles and lack of skilled human force. Shrestha and Timilsina (2002) argue that these 
barriers would remain anyway whether the project is considered for the CDM or not. 
However, I would like to point out that governmental interest in the CDM itself and/or 
revenues from the CERs, if significant enough, may help overcome some of the above 
mentioned barriers. On the other hand, there is a risk to create a perverse incentive for the 
hosting country to keep the regulatory or political barriers to clean technology transfer, if 
they are a prerequisite for the CDM and associated foreign investments.  
In order to evaluate the economic additionality, the following criteria has been proposed by 
a range of studies, summarized by Greiner and Michaelowa (2003). The CDM project is 
economically additional if: 
• Real barriers to the CDM activity can be demonstrated, which are absent for the 
reference case, and activities to overcome them; 
• Total or investment costs of the CDM project activity exceed those of the reference 
case; 
• The net present value (NPV) of the reference case is bigger than NPV of the CDM 
project activity; 
• The internal rate of return (IRR) of the reference case is bigger than IRR of the 
CDM project activity; 
• The difference between NPV or IRR with the CERs and without the CERs is 
significant compared to NPV or IRR without the CERs 
The study shows that each of the criteria has drawbacks and may not be applicable for all 
projects. For example, the last criterion if applied to a highly profitable project might 
reflect large additional revenue coming from CERs, thus claiming the project additional. 
However, being very attractive financially, such project would hardly be defined as 
additional. This criterion may work for slightly unprofitable projects, for which the 
additional revenue from carbon trading may bring the NPV to a positive level. However, 
thinking about possible manipulations, carbon revenue is highly dependent on the CERs 
prices, thus being not a very reliable criterion.  
Greiner and Michaelowa (2003) state that financial indicators, such as NPV and IRR, are 
more reliable and should always be used when performing an economic additionality test. 
For socially important profitable projects facing barriers, the first criterion may work well, 
if the activities to overcome barriers are described and the role of the CDM is shown. This 
concerns the small-scale projects which benefit from a preferential regime of the simplified 
additionality demonstration through a barrier test. 
3.3 Barriers to energy efficiency in households 
According to the procedure for the small-scale energy efficiency projects, their 
additionality has to be tested against the barriers. In 2007 the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP)  together with the Central European University (CEU) 
developed a guide on assessment of the policy instruments for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from buildings. The study lists general barriers to energy efficiency in buildings 
(Koeppel and Urge-Vorsatz, 2007): 
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• High initial cost 
Implementation of retrofit measures involves a certain investment, sometimes quite 
substantial. Energy consumers, especially low-income households or public institutions in 
developing countries, cannot afford a high upfront cost of the efficiency improvements. A 
high initial investment is believed to be the most important financial barrier to energy 
efficiency. 
• Hidden costs and benefits 
The profitability of energy efficiency measures is based on a comparison between the main 
initial investment and returns on it in the form of energy savings. However, besides a high 
investment cost, there are hidden costs to the consumer during the use phase, which are not 
calculated in the expenses: high transaction costs due to fragmentation of the end-users and 
market risks associated with the new technology (required additional investments into 
infrastructure or price fluctuations for fuel, etc.). Besides costs there are also hidden 
benefits to the end-users, which are again not accounted in the cash flow: improved indoor 
climate, better comfort, improved air quality and health.  
• Market failures 
Basically, the only ones who are interested in energy savings are the end-users who pay the 
energy bills. In the market, the end-users are not always the owners of the building, 
responsible for the investments into the upgrade of the building and its systems. Thus, the 
benefits are received not by those who invest. This difference is called “a split incentive” in 
the literature. The energy producers are not interested in reducing the consumption either, 
because this increases their production costs. In the case of the public sector, the 
institutions are limited in their expenditures by the budget. 
• Behavioral constraints 
Individual households as well as companies tend to neglect small opportunities to save 
energy. Usually it is difficult to change habits and the lifestyle. Behavior patterns can be to 
some extent explained by the lack of awareness and access to information, especially in the 
developing countries. On the other hand, the changes in the consumption pattern after the 
level of energy service and cost changes influences the expected savings. Rebound effects 
reduce the potential savings for some energy efficiency measures by 5-75% (Srestha and 
Timilsina, 2002). In the developing countries, especially among low-income strata, the heat 
demand is not fulfilled, so there is a significant need for the energy consumption increase. 
The public sector is constrained in this case by the budget limits, but tends to increase its 
consumption too, especially for the sectors, where the indoor climate is important: schools, 
kindergartens, hospitals.  
• Policy barriers 
In the developing countries there is still an insufficient interest and therefore enforcement 
of the energy efficiency at the governmental level; subsidized energy tariffs create a 
disincentive for the consumers to implement energy efficiency measures; the lack of 
qualified personnel and decision-makers; bureaucracy and corruption.  
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The CDM-specific barriers to energy efficiency are mainly repeating the same categories, 
but I would like to focus on the particular 3 barriers, which are specific for the CDM, and 
especially for energy efficiency in households, involving fuel switch measures and one 
barrier, which is specific for public buildings. 
3.3.1 Transaction costs 
The transaction costs theory was developed by Ronald Coase in 1932 when he was giving a 
lecture at the School of Economics and Commerce in Dundee, Scotland. Ronald Coase 
described this theory in 1937 in the paper “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase, 1991). Later in 
1960 in his article “The Problem of the Social Cost” Ronald Coase explains the nature of 
the transaction costs: “In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover 
who it is that one wishes to deal with, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on” (Coase, 1960, p. 15).  
Small-scale projects are generating smaller amounts of emission reductions than large-scale 
projects, thus unable to rely solely on the revenue stream from emission trading (Wang et 
al., 2003). Taking into account the fact that most of the registered projects have also low 
financial attractiveness, any additional costs can prevent the project to enter the pipeline.  
Transaction costs include those costs, absence of which would not result in higher 
emissions, if the project is implemented. This means that bearing such costs does not result 
in additional GHG emission reductions, generating no additional revenue (Chadwick, 
2006). However, without such costs, the CDM project would not be initiated and 
registered. CDM transaction costs include the following categories (“degressive” in the list 
means “decreasing with the increase in the project scale”) (Michaelowa et al., 2003): 
• Search costs: fixed costs for searching partners for the projects; 
• Negotiation costs: degressive costs of the project design document preparation and 
public consultations with the stakeholders; 
• Baseline determination costs: fixed consultancy cost of the baseline development;  
• Approval costs: fixed costs of the project approval from the Designated National 
Authority; 
• Validation costs: fixed costs of the review of the PDD by the Designated 
Operational Entity; 
• Review costs: costs of reviewing a validation report by the Executive Board; 
• Registration costs: fixed registration fee paid to the EB; 
• Monitoring costs: fixed costs to collect real performance data; 
• Verification costs: degressive costs of verification of the monitoring results by the 
DOE; 
• Review costs: costs of reviewing the verification report by the EB; 
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• Certification costs: degressive cost of issuance of the CERs by the EB; 
• Enforcement costs: proportional costs of the administrative and legal measures in 
the case of deviations from the agreed transaction; 
• Trading costs; 
• Transfer costs;  
• Registration costs: costs of an account in the national registry. 
The pre-operational or up-front transaction costs are those costs, borne before the project 
commissioning (in the list: all costs before monitoring costs). According to the Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF - a carbon finance unit at the World Bank) the pre-operational costs are 
estimated at 265 000 USD, while EcoSecurities estimated the minimum up-front cost in 
2002 for a CDM project at 80 000 USD. The simplified procedure for the small-scale 
projects cut these costs by 67% according to EcoSecutiries (UNEP, 2004b). Table 3-1 
shows the estimates for the transaction costs in the recent literature: 
Table 3-1 Transaction costs for large- and small-scale CDM projects according to recent 
studies 
Pre-implementation (USD) Implementation (USD) Study from recent 
literature Large-scale Small-scale Large-scale Small-scale 
PCF (2003) 265 000 110 000 45 000 – 70 000 7 000 – 20 000 
Mariyappan et al. 
(2005) 
71 000 28 400                
122 500,  if 
bundled 
132 000  30 000                
48 000, if bundled 
Walsh (2000) 100 000 – 500 
000 
40 000 – 80 000 10% - 20% of pre-
implementation 
10% - 20% of pre-
implementation 
Martens et al. (2001) For small-scale solar heating:                                                                                                        
20% of CERs value                                                                                                               
50% higher, if no simplified procedures 
Michaelowa and 
Jotzo (2005) 
Large- scale total: 0.1 – 1 per t CO2;                                                                                          
Small-scale total: 10  – 1000 per t CO2 
De Gouvello and 
Coto (2003) 
Large- scale total: 100 000 – 1 100 000;                                                                  
Small-scale total: 23 000 – 80 000 
Source: constructed using data from indicated literature sources 
The studies give a variety of costs depending on the types of projects, their scale, amount 
of CO2 emission reductions generated, length of the credit period, Designated Operational 
Entities involved in the project cycle, carbon finance institution, if any, and agreement 
type, complexity of baseline study and monitoring, number and complexity of 
consultations, frequency of verification, etc (Michaelowa et al., 2003; IETA, 2006). 
Increase in transaction costs may arise from other barriers, one of which is the monitoring 
barrier of dispersed consumers. In order to reduce fixed costs small scale projects use 
bundling of the project activities in one project design document. However, this incurs 
higher monitoring and verification costs due to high fragmentation of the project activities 
and the CDM requirement to submit monitoring data for each of the project activities in the 
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bundle (Kumar et al., 2004). With this barrier some other aspects are associated, like weak 
methodologies, information and data barriers, etc (Cheng, 2008).   
3.3.2 Market risks 
The energy conservation measures are effective due to installation of the new and more 
efficient appliances or improving the performance indicators of the building envelope. 
There are hidden costs of implementing any new technology. In case of a decentralized fuel 
switch (building’s boiler) it is more obvious: if market price for the new technology fuel 
increases, this means increase in total spending, possibly preventing the system to generate 
savings. If the energy budget of the building is limited to a certain amount, the fuel 
consumption has to be limited too or even decrease, leading to no improvements in the 
indoor climate. One of possible solutions can be implementation of the demand-side 
improvements (as opposed to the supply-side, which fuel switch in reality is). End-use 
efficiency has the direct proportional relation with the fuel prices: the higher is the price, 
the larger are the savings. 
In case of the CDM, the CERs prices are also presenting a market risk for a project’s 
financial performance. If the project’s profitability is dependent on the assumed revenue 
from the CERs and it is the only revenue, the project might be at risk. The figure below 
represents projects with a different profitability and CERs implications. The eligibility of 
the projects is defined upon the economic additionality. It is easy to understand what would 
happen to the profitability of the project with the CERs revenue in column 4, if the NPV of 
the CERs revenue were reduced due to a price change: it will become unprofitable 
(Chadwick, 2006).  
 
Figure 3-6 Variations in CDM project profitability and eligibility based on CERs revenue 
Source: Chadwick, 2006 
The prices for the CERs are very speculative. CERs are traded in three different markets: 
voluntary market, allowance market and a project-based system. Projects which belong to 
portfolios of the carbon finance institutions, such as the Prototype Carbon Fund, or 
programs, like CERUPT, experience different prices set in the respective agreements. 
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Usually, the prices range from 3 to 5 USD per CER in such projects (UNEP, 2004c). The 
price varies depending on the type of project, technology used, presence of the 
governmental guarantee, level of risk, degree of social benefit (UNEP, 2004b). 
3.3.3 Suppressed demand and rebound effect 
In the developing countries most of the households’ energy consumption is below the heat 
demand frontier. They simply cannot afford consuming enough energy to meet their 
demand. More efficient installations and operation would reduce the use-phase costs and 
provide for increase in energy consumption. Increased consumption may result in the 
negative emission reductions, making such project ineligible for the CDM under the 
environmental additionality requirement (Thorne and Mqadi, 2003).  
In 2000 a consultancy company in South Africa “SouthSouthNorth” developed a concept 
of a suppressed demand baseline for the thermal insulation measures in the low-income 
households in Kuyuasa, South Africa. The concept establishes the baseline for the project 
at a level of energy consumption in the absence of the suppressed demand, that is at the 
level of the fulfilled heat demand. The emission reductions in this case are equal to the 
difference in the energy consumption before and after the thermal insulation at the indoor 
temperature which satisfies the household’s needs (UNFCCC, 2005; Mqadi and Malgas, 
2004).  
The Modalities and Procedures, in paragraph 27, state: “The baseline for a CDM project 
activity is the scenario that reasonably represents…emissions that would occur in the 
absence of the proposed project activity”; while in paragraph 36: “The baseline may 
include a scenario where future anthropogenic emissions by sources are projected to rise 
above current levels, due to the specific circumstances of the host Party” (Thorne and 
Mqadi, 2003). These statements were used by the Kuyasa project designers to incorporate 
the increase in the projected emissions into the baseline scenario. 
The approach was innovative and approved by the Executive Board for this particular 
project. However, the baseline chosen in this case is purely theoretical, increase in the 
energy consumption for such low-income households may happen well after the end of the 
crediting period (UNFCCC, 2005; Mqadi and Malgas, 2004). Overestimation of the 
baseline emissions for the Kuyasa project was justified by the extremely low energy 
consumption and insignificant potential emission reductions, while project had significant 
potential to contribute to the sustainable development. The suppressed demand model was 
used in the Kuyasa project to increase the emission reductions to a viable level, due to the 
extremely low energy consumption (Cheng C., interview on June 2, 2008). In order to give 
a way to the CDM projects in South Africa, the suppressed demand baseline approach was 
accepted for this project. 
Inclusion of the suppressed demand in the baseline scenario is very important for the 
achievement of the sustainability goals under the CDM in the developing countries. If the 
suppressed demand is accounted to its full extent, the credit is given in such projects for the 
“emissions avoided due to poverty and suppressed demand” (Thorne, 2001). In his 
presentation at the side event of COP 7, Michaelowa (2001) noted that projects addressing 
the suppressed demand generate income for poor and create a possibility to afford 
consumer good and services, including better energy supply. He outlined three types of 
suppressed demand projects: 
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• energy services: efficient supply and transmission, renewable energy, or cleaner 
fuels;  
• goods: efficient appliances or efficient production processes;  
• transport: efficient infrastructure or vehicles. 
Increase in the energy consumption due to the improved energy efficiency and therefore 
decreased energy cost is called “a rebound effect”. The rebound effect is a phenomenon of 
the economic theory, which was first described by Staneley Jevons in 1865 when he 
noticed that a new and more efficient steam engine led to decrease in the coal price, which 
triggered a higher demand for coal (Gottron, 2001). In conditions of the suppressed 
demand the rebound effect can significantly reduce savings generated by the energy 
efficiency projects. For some demand-side energy efficiency projects the energy savings 
have been reduced by as much as 75% due to the rebound effect (Shrestha and Timilsina, 
2002). Depending on the level of the demand suppression and amount of potential savings, 
efficiency projects in such conditions may result in no savings due to the demand for the 
higher energy consumption. 
3.3.4 Split incentive and budgetary contraints 
The split incentive in the households can be explained by a difference in the interests of 
those who own the building and those who use it. The owner is the one who is expected to 
invest into the housing improvements; the user is the one who would get the savings on the 
bill. If the owner and the user were the same entity, there would be no discrepancy 
(Koeppel and Urge-Vorsatz, 2007). 
In the case of the public buildings, the split incentive is trickier. It depends to a large extent 
on the national regulations on the public finance. The public institution is limited by the 
budget constraints. The budget is accorded to the institution by the municipality, whose 
budget is also controlled by the central authority. If in year 1 the municipality undertook 
some energy saving measures in a public building, which it owns, in year 2 the budget line 
subsidizing energy consumption will be cut exactly by the amount of savings. Thus, 
undertaking the investments, the owner and the user cannot benefit from the savings; 
instead, these savings are returned back to the budget of the central authority and 
redistributed to those activities which need more financing. If the municipalities owning 
the public buildings were independent of the central authorities (district, Ministry, 
government), then there would be no split incentive (USAID, nd, 2006). 
In the case of the budgetary constaints the energy efficiency projects lose its economic 
attractiveness represented by the generated savings. If the governmental control over the 
municipal budget is too strict, there is no incentive for the municipality and a public 
building to carry out the activity. On the other hand, if there is a possibility for more 
flexible budget management (for example, as a result of a special agreement or change in 
the state regulations), the savings can be used by the municipality for own purposes, one of 
which may be acquisition of more energy services, in case of the unfulfilled demand.  
In case the restriction on the savings retention exists, but the repayment of the loan 
borrowed for the project implementation is subsidized, the project would be implemented, 
but will not achieve its sustainability goals. If the savings are not to be used for the loan 
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repayment and should be given back to the central budget there is no possibility for the 
public institution to improve the indoor comfort, if there is a shortage in the energy service 
(EnEffect, 2001).   
The budget execution and regulations on the public financing are closely related to the 
issue of the suppressed demand. Strict regulations and control over the allocations create 
disincentives for participation and do not contribute to the sustainable development goals 
under the the CDM provisions. The municipal autonomy creates more flexibility in the use 
of the generated income; however, in this case the issue of the rebound effect should be 
carefully addressed. The possibility to spend the savings on the increased energy 
consumption improves the social aspect of the public institutions, but within the framework 
of the CDM it results in the environmental underperformance. 
3.4 Summary 
Literature review contributed to answering two of the research questions: 
• How is the performance of the CDM project defined ex-ante? 
• What market and policy conditions exist to the financial and environmental 
performance of CDM projects on energy efficiency in households? 
Based on the reviewed literature the ex-ante performance was defined as the baseline 
setting and additionality demonstration; some implications of the economic additionality 
justification were presented for the small-scale CDM projects collected in the course of the 
literature review. The literature review helps the reader identify the common barriers to 
energy efficiency in households and choose among them the ones that would be relevant 
for the CMD case study on energy efficiency and fuel switch in public buildings in 
Moldova: the suppressed demand and the rebound effect; the budgetary constraints and the 
associated split incentive; the market risks due to fluctuation of the market prices for the 
fuel and CERs; and transaction costs. Partially, the literature review contributed to 
answering the question about the possible impacts of the barriers on the project’s financial 
and environmental performance; however, such estimates are rather qualitative. 
Further the research is structured according to the research questions and the methodology. 
After reviewing the literature and answering two of the research questions the study 
proceeds with the analysis of the documentation for a practical illustration of the CDM 
project on energy efficiency in households and assessment of its performance with the 
alternative scenario building and sensitivity analyses against the barriers identified through 
the literature review.  
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4 Case study: Moldova Energy Conservation and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Project 
4.1 Heating sector in Moldova 
Moldova is very limited in its natural energy resources. Therefore it is largely dependent on 
the imported fuels from Ukraine and Russia. The centralized electricity and heat production 
is fully based on the natural gas.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the energy system in Moldova has been 
experiencing a lot of technical, financial and managerial challenges. The district heating 
systems became obsolete and deteriorated, with the low supply and distribution efficiency. 
Historically, the district heating was supply-oriented, offering low flexibility to the 
consumers. For instance, individual apartments in the cities still cannot regulate their heat 
consumption by using valves, if they are connected to the district heating.  
Due to financial difficulties the consumers were reducing their heat consumption and by 
2004 it constituted only 20-40% of the consumption level of 1990 (USAID, 2006). Such 
changes in the consumption pattern made the oversized heating system costly and 
inefficient. Most of its users started disconnecting from the district heating and installing 
the individual gas-fired boilers. Individual heating systems offered flexibility in controlling 
the system, better thermal comfort, higher efficiency and less operational costs in the use 
phase. However, the initial investment in such a system is usually high and cannot be 
afforded by each consumer. 
Functioning district heating systems now remained only in big cities: Chisinau and Balti; 
although individual heating systems per apartment or house are also widely used in these 
cities. All smaller municipalities and rural areas either do not have heating systems at all or 
consumers in these areas installed coal, gas, wood or heavy fuel fired boilers for the 
individual heating. Some buildings use electricity to heat the areas individually. 
Public buildings, such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals and cultural institutions are 
heated individually. Municipal authorities or other institutions owning the buildings (the 
Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Health) allocate the resources for the heating 
needs in such buildings annually. They are also responsible for allocating the financing for 
renovation and other improvements. However, municipalities are very limited in their 
financial capabilities. Most of the public budget is allocated for the salaries. 20-40% of the 
budget is allocated for the energy expenditures (USAID, 2006). Only a small portion of the 
budget is dedicated to renovation or reconstruction activities. Thus, efficiency 
improvements, especially requiring large initial investments, are a heavy cost burden for 
the public buildings. 
Municipalities are dependent on the central budgets. Since 1999 according to the Law on 
Public Finances the municipalities can take commercial loans, however, there is a limit on 
annual reimbursement of loans of 20% of the total budget revenue for the given year 
(USAID, 2006). Another large disincentive to implement measures aimed at a higher 
efficiency and savings is the inability to keep or use savings for own purposes by the 
municipalities. The generated reductions in costs are automatically subtracted from the 
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next year budget for the same institution, thus creating a strong disincentive for any energy 
saving activity (USAID, 2006). 
4.2 Energy II Project 
In 2003 the Government of Moldova elaborated a National Program for Energy 
Conservation for the period 2003 – 2010 and a new Energy Strategy until 2020 that focuses 
on the more efficient, competitive and reliable national energy industry, at the same time 
ensuring the energy security, upgrading of the energy-related infrastructure, and improving 
energy efficiency, etc (UNDP and ME, 2000; Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008). 
According to the Strategy, the most important tasks of Moldova in the energy sector are:  
• ensuring the energy security of the country;  
• implementation of the real measures for the power market liberalization with the 
view of integrating Moldova in the European energy system; 
• increase in energy efficiency of the production, transmission, distribution, and 
consumption of energy resources;  
• introduction of renewable sources of energy, where economically reasonable. 
The improvement of efficiency in the energy sector assumes a reduction of the greenhouse 
gas emissions and contribution to the environmental improvements, such as air quality 
improvement. The action plan for the National Strategy foresees the reduction of a share of 
coal in the energy production by maximum 5% and the correspondent increase in the use of 
natural gas and growth of energy efficiency in the energy production by maximum 5% and 
in the small combustion sub-sector by 10% by 2010 (UNDP and ME, 2000).  
The Energy II Project proposed in 2003 has the objectives in line with the National Energy 
Strategy. It foresees an upgrade of the electricity systems, improvement of the heating 
supply and efficiency, and technical assistance to the energy policy reforms.  
The CDM project on Energy Conservation and Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in 
Moldova has been based on the on-going Energy II Project financed by International 
Development Agency (IDA)/WB and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
(UNFCCC, 2006). One of the objectives of the Energy II Project includes improvement of 
the heating efficiency in the selected public buildings in different districts of Moldova. A 
total of 80 buildings in 8 municipalities were planned to participate in the project.  By 2008 
the heating systems have been upgraded for 35 public institutions and a number of 
residential buildings. The legal and institutional framework in Moldova did not let the 
project include residential buildings and other commercial users in the list of beneficiaries. 
However, those historically connected to the heating supply of the nearby public objects 
residential buildings are not allowed to be disconnected from the renovated heating system. 
The majority of selected buildings are located in the small municipalities or rural areas of 
Moldova. All of the beneficiaries are public institutions financed from a municipal, district 
or governmental budget – schools, kindergartens and hospitals. The main activities within 
the heating upgrade component of the Energy II Project include replacement of the existing 
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boilers, switch of the existing fuels to the natural gas, improved thermal insulation of the 
heat distribution grid and the building’s heating systems, installation of the new automatic 
substations and metering equipment. In some of the buildings besides the heating system 
the hot water supply system has been improved. The total amount of the credit for the 
heating component is 9.8 million USD (WB, 2003).  
The financing for the heating component is lent from the Ministry of Finance as portions of 
IDA credit as direct loans to municipalities with a guarantee from the district authorities, or 
as a loan to the district authority with the subsequent lending to the municipality. Because 
of limited financial capability of the municipalities, the loan is subsidized for the local 
authorities or project beneficiaries by the Ministry of Finance according to the IDA terms 
(UNFCCC, 2006).  
The decision to implement decentralized heating systems based on the heat-only-boilers for 
the public buildings has been based on the outcomes of the report prepared by the WB and 
SIDA in 2001. The report states that decentralized heating is the most affordable and 
thermally comfortable alternative to the deteriorated district heating in municipalities of 
Moldova. Centralized systems are deteriorated, oversized and very inefficient. However, 
the total investment cost for the decentralized systems is higher than for the centralized or 
semi-centralized; although in the long-run the decentralized systems are more cost-
effective and offer a greater flexibility to the consumers. Semi-centralized heating has been 
suggested for the districts with the higher density of consumers, where the losses could be 
minimized, like in Ungheni. 
The project is carried out in packages. The first package was completed by 2003 and 
consisted of a pilot project on installation of the gas-fired heating boilers and rehabilitation 
of pipes in a semi-centralized heating system in Ungheni. Within the framework of the 
project 14 house boilers were installed for a number of public buildings and historically 
connected to the district heating residential buildings located nearby (USAID, 2006).  
The second package included installation of the individual gas boilers and renovation of the 
heat distribution grid in the districts of Floresti, Straseni and Cantemir (see map of 
Moldova in the Annex A). The third package included activities in the districts of Leova, 
Nisporeni, Briceni, Falesti and Ialoveni. The project agreement foresaw a local 
municipality contribution for each of the districts, which would vary depending on the 
municipality’s financial capability (Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008). In Floresti, 
for example, the local contribution was up to 10%, including gasification of the objects and 
engineering works. In some of the districts, the municipalities also sought financial aid for 
the energy efficiency improvements on the demand-side, which were not to be financed 
through the Energy II Project. In Floresti the demand-side energy efficiency measures 
included replacement of windows and doors for the project buildings. The investments for 
these activities were undertaken by the private entities and the state (Tsap, 2006). 
The project results were (Tsap, 2006): 
• Increased indoor temperature from 13-15 C to 18-20 C; 
• Reduced cost of the heat supply by 30 – 50% ; 
• No need to have prolonged winter holidays;  
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• Possibility to run activities in public buildings, such as cultural institutions, during 
winter too; 
• Significantly cleaner exhaust from the boilers. Most of beneficiaries noted that the 
snow near the buildings is not as dirty as used to be when coal was used as the 
heating fuel (Braga D., interview on July 14, 2008). 
There have been no studies on the value of the external benefits, such as 
reduction/elimination of the lost schools days, reduction of the illness incidents, improved 
education and health care. 
4.3 Case study: Moldova Energy Conservation and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Project 
27 out of 35 institutions were selected to participate in the CDM project on Energy 
Conservation and Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in Moldova (hereafter Moldova 
CDM Project). The project activities generating emission reductions are implemented 
under the Energy II Project, while the monitoring of GHG emissions is performed by the 
Carbon Finance Unit Moldova (CFU) (CFU, 2006).  
The reason for participation in the CDM can be explained by the financial barriers existing 
in the Energy II Project. Project beneficiaries are budget institutions with limited resources 
to reimburse the credit. Most of participants were reluctant to bear the full cost of the 
project. In order to keep the project’s scale the Community Development Carbon Fund 
(CDCF) of the World Bank proposed to include a CDM component in the project that 
would generate certain revenue from the emission reductions that would partially cover the 
project costs for the beneficiaries (Gastelumendi J., telephone interview on July 7, 2008).  
Due to the changes in the initial activity plans within the Energy II Project some of the 
participants dropped out from the project, 8 of them were also beneficiaries of the CDM 
component. This resulted in reduction of the number of beneficiaries to 19 (see Annex B) 
(Drucioc S., interview on July 14, 2008).  
The project activities started a year later than planned, due to the project approval in 2005 
and subsequent registration in 2006. Therefore, the changes in the energy consumption and 
emissions reductions had been recorded starting in January 2006. Besides, implementation 
of the Project Activity 3 was postponed until 2006, while the Project Activity 6, for which 
works were planned for 2006, had undergone the implementation with the rest of the 
Project Activities (PAs) in 2005 (CFU, 2007). 
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Figure 4-1 Leova District Hospital. Old 
boiler 
Source: MEPIU, 2008           
Figure 4-2 Leova District Hospital. New 
boiler 
Source: MEPIU, 2008 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Nisporeni District Hospital. Old 
substation  
Source: MEPIU, 2008           
Figure 4-4 Nisporeni District Hospital. New 
substation  
Source: MEPIU, 2008          
 
The project is planned to be extended with a new credit line disbursed in 2008 by WB 
through IDA. The implementation unit of the Energy II Project – MEPIU - has been 
visiting the potential beneficiaries of the project for selection of the buildings. The criteria 
for selection include the building’s ownership, heated area, the scale of the needed 
investment, building’s design (Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008).  The new project 
will also apply for the CDM (Drucioc S., interview on July 14, 2008). In Figures 4-5 – 4-8 
below are illustrated objects of the potential participants in the extension to the Energy II 
Project: a school and a kindergarten in the town of Soroca. The school has an old boiler 
house in the basement, which is not functioning. The kindergarten has a similar boiler 
house which is out of date, while heating is provided by several wood-fired stoves located 
in the premises. 
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Figure 4-5 Soroca secondary school. Non-
operating substation  
Source: Irina Costromitcaia, field trip, July 
17, 2008          
Figure 4-6 Soroca secondary school. Non-
operating bioler 
Source: Irina Costromitcaia, field trip, July 
17, 2008          
  
Figure 4-7 Soroca kindergarten. Old boiler  
Source: Irina Costromitcaia, field trip, July 
17, 2008           
Figure 4-8 Soroca kindergarten. Wood 
stove  
Source: Irina Costromitcaia, field trip, July 
17, 2008            
 
Uncertainties in financing Clean Development Mechanism projects 
35 
4.4 Additionality 
In the case of Moldova CDM Project, two categories of activities are implemented within 
the project framework: II.E. “Energy efficiency and fuel switching activities in 
buildings”and III.B. “Switch of fossil fuels”. Both of them include supply and/or demand-
side energy efficiency and fuel switching measure. However, if the main activity is energy 
efficiency then the project falls into the category II.E, if switch of fuels – category III.B. 
The categories set limits for the scale of the projects. The category II.E. allows aggregate 
energy savings in the amount not bigger than 15 GWh/year. Project activities under the 
category III.B. have to contribute to the emission reduction and altogether emit less than 15 
kilotons CO2e/year (UNFCCC, 2007b, 2008b, c; UNFCCC, 2006). Such limits possibly 
exclude the potential beneficiaries, which otherwise need to be bundled in a new CDM 
project and apply anew for the approval and registration. However, this is time-consuming 
and increases the total costs, while for the typical buildings larger bundles and higher limits 
or no limits at all would be a better solution. Such an approach is suggested in the 
programmatic CDM for the small-scale activities. 
For the category of retrofits in which the Moldova project falls, the baseline scenario 
should be based on the characteristics of the existing equipment, if the project stays within 
limits of the existing capacity/output/level of the energy service. For the increased capacity 
or a new facility, the additionality should be demonstrated using steps 1-3 of the 
“Combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality” 
(UNFCCC, 2007a), which is applicable for any type and scale of the project. Steps 1-3 
include an assessment of alternative scenarios, barrier assessment and investment analysis, 
if applicable. Although the Moldova project activities include an increase in the capacity, 
inclusion of the suppressed demand, presented in the PDD, explains the increase in the 
output and demonstrates no use of the increased capacity during the crediting period due to 
a low consumption growth rate. This allows the project designers to stay within the 
requirements for the retrofit category and use only a barrier test to prove the additionality, 
thus cutting the transaction costs through the use of a simplified methodology. 
In case that the suppressed demand is not included in the baseline scenario, the project 
might not pass the environmental additionality test. The simplified methodology for the 
baseline setting for the small-scale projects of the category III.B. assume the baseline 
scenario as the existing level of the emissions (UNEP, 2004b). Historically the energy 
consumption and therefore the emissions level had been decreasing since 1990 due to 
financial problems. The level of consumption in 2004 (reference year for the project) 
constituted only 10-40% of the required by the standard. The project scenario showed the 
increase in the consumption and respective emissions, due to the increased financial 
capacity and the existing unfulfilled demand for heating (UNFCCC, 2006). Therefore, if 
the baseline was constructed based on the current energy consumption in 2004 the emission 
level would be higher after the project implementation, generating no emission reductions. 
This will be further elaborated in the Section 5.1. 
With the barrier test for the retrofits with a higher initial cost, the financial additionality of 
the CERs revenue is the one of the possible ways of demonstrating additionality, because 
in retrofitting, there is no additional revenue stream. Savings in such projects are 
comparably small. This approach was used by the Moldova project designers. The 
technical expert of the CFU Moldova, Mr. Dumitru Braga (interview on July 14, 2008), 
stated that some of the potential project beneficiaries, namely, public organizations, were 
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not willing to participate in the Energy II Project having zero revenue stream. They 
correctly assumed the costs to be too high to afford on their own, while the credit 
reimbursement would most likely distract the budget allocations. Thus, the CDM was used 
as means to promote energy efficiency in the public building sector (Braga D., interview on 
July 14, 2008; Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008).  
Due to the fact that most of the public buildings cannot afford the initial cost, the credit 
scheme was used for implementation of the project, offered by IDA/WB. However, limited 
budget resources of the public buildings are unable to reimburse the full cost of the credit 
within the project period. Therefore, additional credits from the emission reductions were 
considered to secure the credit reimbursement. In the case of lack of revenue from the 
emission trading, the project would have reduced its scale, thus excluding a number of 
beneficiaries from the project (Gastelumendi J., interview on July 7, 2008). 
In the end, unfortunately, a number of PAs dropped out from the project, due to reasons 
independent from the CDM project management. However, while the deliberate reduction 
of the bundle size would be done taking into account the financial impact of such an action, 
the drop out negatively affected the project results: the project lost more than 50 000 t CO2 
of the emission reductions (CFU and MEPIU, 2005).  
To conclude, Moldova CDM project is a good example of an additional project, which 
clearly demonstrates using the CDM as means to overcome a financial barrier of the high 
initial cost to promote energy efficiency.  
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5 Case study analysis 
5.1  Rebound effects 
5.1.1 Suppressed demand 
The baseline fuel used for heating of the PAs is coal, wood or heavy fuel oil combusted in 
the obsolete boilers and stoves with the efficiency range from 40% for stoves to 87% for 
heavy fuel oil boilers (see Annex B). Due to financial and infrastructural constraints the 
project beneficiaries could not afford the level of the energy consumption which would 
satisfy the demand and allow maintaining the normal indoor temperature over the whole 
heating period. The baseline level of the energy consumption constituted only 10-40% of 
the energy consumption level in 1990 (the standard level of heating) and the average 
heating period reduced by half from 6 months to 3 (UNFCCC, 2006).   
If the project beneficiaries were consuming the amount of energy required to maintain 
normal heating conditions and the only reason for the lower temperature would have been 
losses due to inefficiency, the project might generate energy savings. However, the level of 
the energy consumption was constrained by the budget limits and installed capacity and 
was lower than demanded. Due to the annual growth of the budget subsidies for the public 
organizations between 4-10% on average, the increase in spending on energy is expected, 
thus raising the energy consumption as projected by 5% annually (CFU, 2006).  
The growth in the energy consumption results in a longer heating period, higher indoor 
temperatures, increase of the heated area, if needed, and overall comfort and health 
benefits. This expected growth in the consumption patterns for the energy service is 
occurring due to the unfulfilled or “suppressed demand”.  
The main idea of the suppressed demand baseline consists of avoiding the exclusion from 
the CDM of the energy improvement projects for poor, which result in the increased energy 
consumption after the project implementation. Low-income consumers (whether 
households, or as in the present case, financially constrained public buildings) usually 
cannot afford a normal level of energy consumption required to fulfill the needs for the 
energy service. Due to financial or infrastructural problems such consumers tend to keep 
their consumption level very low, much lower than demanded (Mqadi and Malgas, 2004). 
Implementation of an energy efficient technology saves energy and money for such 
consumers creating conditions for a rebound effect - consuming more energy and affording 
better comfort level.  
Following the traditional CDM methodology for calculating the environmental 
additionality of the project, such increase in the energy consumption may exclude the 
project from participation in the CDM. The level of emissions in the presence of the project 
will most likely be higher than the actual emissions at a low level of the energy 
consumption, resulting in negative emission reductions and making such a project not 
additional and therefore ineligible for use of the CDM. The inclusion of the rebound effect 
in the baseline gives a possibility to compare the baseline and the actual consumption on 
fair grounds.  
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In the Moldova case, it was expected and calculated by the project designers that the same 
level of the heat consumption as in the reference year 2004 would not be kept throughout 
the crediting period. They did not use the notion of the suppressed demand and the rebound 
effect to describe the annual 5 % growth incorporated in the baseline scenario. However, 
inclusion of the increased consumption in the baseline due to the unsatisfied energy 
demand is reflecting the same idea.   
If we take a look at the total embodied heat consumption for the 27 Pas, the amount needed 
to maintain the normal indoor temperature during the full-length heating season in 2004 
(before the project implementation) is equal to 222 164 MWh, while after the  
implementation of the project this amount would be reduced to 123 066 MWh due to 
elimination of the losses and improved boiler and distribution efficiency. The actual heat 
consumption in 2004 was 54652 MWh (all the figures calculated based on the data from 
the CFU and MEPIU, 2005).  
  
 
Figure 5-1 Suppressed demand 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
In order to find how much the consumption is suppressed in the project public buildings, it 
should be calculated the amount of the heat embodied in the fuel needed to provide for the 
normal heating conditions in the public buildings in case no project has taken place and if 
the project is implemented. Normal conditions satisfy the standard requirements for the 
heating season length of 4350 hours (6 months) and the temperature regime required for the 
given types of public buildings (18 – 21 C depending on the type of the building: school, 
kindergarten or hospital). The difference between the amount of the heat consumed for the 
normal indoor climate conditions without the project and after the project implementation 
constitutes the energy savings that the project would generate annually in the absence of the 
suppressed demand. After the implementation of the project this difference is lower due to 
the energy savings occurring as a result of the efficiency improvement measures (see Fig. 
5-1). 
Heat consumption required to 
maintain the normal 
temperature without the project 
Heat consumption required to 
maintain the normal 
temperature with the project 
Current heat consumption  
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So, assuming that sometime in the future the consumer will reach a required level of the 
heating we can project what would be the emission level if the demand is unsuppressed, 
both in the absence and presence of the project. The difference between these values will 
represent the emission reductions for the unsuppressed demand scenario. This approach 
clearly shows that even if the energy consumption is increased relative to the current level, 
the emissions are reduced compared to the emission level that might have occurred in the 
absence of the installed technology (Mqadi and Malgas, 2004).  
While the normal consumption level maybe achieved far beyond the crediting period, it is 
very important to project the suppressed demand and the associated rebound effect 
correctly and set a realistic growth rate. If the actual growth rate is higher than it was 
projected, this would negatively impact the amount of the emission reductions generated. 
The actual figures on Fig. 5-2 show that compared to the baseline consumption in the 
reference year 2004 (the actual measured data) the amount of the energy consumed by the 
19 PAs grew by 28% in 2006, from 12 265 MWh to 15718 MWh, which means an annual 
growth rate considerably higher than the projected 5% in the model. 
 
Figure 5-2 Projected and actual heat consumption 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005; CFU, 
2006, 2007 
The 5% heat consumption growth estimate would lead to reaching by 2017 the energy 
consumption level at which the project beneficiaries would be able to afford the required 
by the standard 4350 hours of heating or a full-length heating season. An average annual 
growth rate of approximately 15% is needed to reach the energy consumption level needed 
for ensuring the normal indoor comfort by the end of the crediting period in 2015 (see Fig. 
5-3).  This growth rate most probably will not be maintained due to a steady increase in the 
gas price and the limits of financing provided from the regional and state budgets. Already 
for the first semester of 2007 the energy consumption decreased by almost 10% compared 
to the same period of 2006. This can be explained by the sharp increase in the natural gas 
price from 110 USD/1000 m3 in the first half of 2006 to 170 USD/1000 m3 in 2007 
(ANRE, 2006, 2007). In its annual report National Agency for Regulation of Energy of 
Moldova (ANRE) (2008b) communicated that the consumption of the natural gas in 
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Moldova was reduced by 8.6% due to warmer winter and spring compared to 2006 and the 
increase in the gas tariff. 
 
Figure 5-3 Scenarios for increasing heat consumption 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
The project model did not take into consideration that the prices for all fuel types would 
rise by more than 6% as expected in the baseline scenario. The real spending of the 
beneficieries on fuel in 2006 would be much higher than assumed by the baseline, 
according to the increased prices for coal (110 USD/t), wood (25 USD/m3), heavy fuel oil 
(300 USD/t) and natural gas (150 USD/1000 m3) (Bordeianu C., interview on July 14, 
2008). While the cost of 1 MWh generated by coal is almost 20 USD and by heavy fuel oil 
is 28 USD, this is more expensive than by natural gas (16 USD) due to the transportation 
costs for the solid fuels (calculated using the data from Annex B). The fuel switch 
measures therefore cut the energy expenses for the 19 beneficiaries in 2006 in approximate 
amount of 350 000 USD (calculated based on the data from CFU and MEPIU, 2008). The 
sharp increase in the energy consumption in 2006 could be explained by the surplus of the 
financial means due to the fuel switch and the existing demand for the increased heating. 
However, public institutions usually face the problem of inflexible budget and inability to 
use the saved financial means. In the case of Moldova CDM project it is relevant to address 
these constraints in conjunction with the unfulfilled heat demand and the possible rebound 
effect.  
5.1.2 Split incentive 
The financial management of the budget institutions is limited to the itemized budgetary 
allocations from the central authority to the municipalities or directly to the public 
institutions (e.g. certain hospitals under the supervision of the Ministry of Health). Any 
savings occurring under a certain item cannot be used for covering shortages in other items, 
but has to be returned to the central budget. A next year allocation for the overestimated 
item will be cut, thus allowing for no savings for the public institution. Therefore, 
municipalities and public buildings are not encouraged to implement efficiency measures 
which generate savings. There are no incentives in a rigid system to reimburse loans from 
the savings or use the saved money for the main activities, for example, to use the 
economic savings from the efficiency improvements in a school to buy books for the 
school library (USAID, 2006; EnEffect, 2001).  
Uncertainties in financing Clean Development Mechanism projects 
41 
The split incentive and the regulatory barriers are a general obstacle to energy efficiency, 
not specific to the CDM. However, if we consider the associated with the CDM 
environmental and social targets and the special circumstances of the suppressed demand 
and the potential rebound effect, the budget execution policy becomes very relevant for the 
assessment of the future performance of the CDM project.  
Assuming a hypothetical ability of the municipalities to increase the budget expenditures 
for the purpose of the investment management, it would be possible to see what would 
happen to the energy consumption and the level of the emissions if the allocations for the 
heating stay the same for the respective year (keeping a 5% annual growth). Certainly, this 
is the maximum possible level of consumption, assuming no growth other than annual 5% 
can be afforded by the central authority (see Fig. 5-4).  
 
Figure 5-4 Alternative scenario for the embodied heat consumption 
Source: constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
If the embodied heat consumption follows the red curve, it means no indoor temperature 
changes happened due to the project implementation: the final energy consumption (useful 
energy) follows the baseline scenario. If the actual embodied heat consumption is anywhere 
between the red and green lines, the temperature increased starting with the year of the 
project implementation, while no heating budget increase was undertaken for the respective 
year.  While it is too early to speak about a tendency, Fig 5-2 “Projected and actual heat 
consumption” shows that the consumption does increase over the projected level for 2006. 
If the consumption follows the green line, it means that the total agreed baseline heating 
budget is spent by the buildings, while investment is not considered to be repaid from 
savings.  
Full spending of the heating budget item might have happened if for example, the 
investment is fully subsidized by the government or accorded as a grant. In this case, there 
is no additional expenditure burden for the buildings. In order to preserve the allocated 
budget, their heat expenditures would grow according to the heat demand, available 
capacity and financial capability. 
In the case when the loan has to be repaid, it is obvious that based on the financial 
capabilities of the public institutions, they would increase their consumption only to a 
level, which still generates savings enough to reimburse the loan, e.g. if the emission 
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reductions are significant enough to generate net profit which can be spent on the increased 
heat consumption. The existing procedure for the budget execution, however, does not 
allow for the municipality to use their revenues freely moving them across the budget lines.  
In order to allow for the project investments to be repaid by the municipalities, the 
procedure for the budget execution was altered in the agreement between the financing 
institution and the beneficiaries. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement between IDA and the 
municipalities signed within the Energy II Project foresees elimination of the risks 
associated with the financial management barriers. All municipalities are required to 
include the operating and debt service costs associated with the new investment as a 
separate line in their annual budgets. The amount of investment and the reimbursement 
scheme was pre-defined according to the ability of the municipalities to increase their 
budgetary expenditures. To minimize the risk of government reducing or eliminating 
subsidies for the heat consumption, it was secured that the government commits itself for 
the maintenance of the subsidies and aligns them with the budget revenues (WB, 2003). 
The financial model constructed in the project design document shows the financial 
savings from the fuel switch and efficiency measures in the public buildings, which are 
used for the loan repayment. Being short of the needed annual savings to cover the whole 
investment cost, the project applied for the CDM to generate tradable CERs to cover the 
gap between the cost and revenue. The reimbursement of the loan is supposed to be 
undertaken based on the achieved energy savings and the revenue from the CERs. Such 
model estimates no shift in the energy consumption, except for a gradual increase of 5% as 
foreseen by the national policies, at least until the end of the loan repayment. This means 
that the indoor temperature increase is assumed to happen only gradually due to the annual 
budget increase and not due to the improved efficiency. In reality, this is not the case. Most 
of beneficiaries reported significant increase in the indoor temperature during the first year 
after the project implementation (Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008). This can be 
explained either by the shift in the energy consumption or improved demand-side energy 
efficiency. 
The shift in the energy consumption could not be incorporated in the project scenario by 
the project designers due to the existing baseline methodology for III.B. projects. The 
methodology foresees that the level of the useful heat consumption stays the same as in the 
baseline scenario. This is a clear deficiency in the project scenario accuracy. It shows no 
consideration of the suppressed demand and therefore excludes an important social effect 
of the project addressing insufficient heating.  However, estimation of the consumption 
shift due to the rebound effect would be a very difficult task to complete. In any case, if the 
shift occurs (due to e.g. a subsidized loan, change in regulations, requirements to achieve 
the indoor comfort targets) the emission reductions resulting from project will decrease 
(Fig. 5-5) 
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Figure 5-5 Alternative scenarios for CO2 emissions 
Source: constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
At the level of the individual project activities (PAs) the changes in the consumption 
patterns are more diverse (see Fig. 5-6). The projected consumption for 2006 expected a 
10% increase compared to the reference consumption in 2004 (CFU and MEPIU, 2005). 
However, for some of the project beneficiaries the consumption drastically decreased, 
while for others increased much more than projected.  
The reasons for the increase in the energy consumption have been already discussed: the 
suppressed demand due to infrastructural and financial constraints - the baseline capacity 
was lower than demanded; the access to the energy source was limited; the savings on 
energy by heating less space or to a lower temperature. Almost all of PAs having no 
heating system due to its deterioration and using electricity for the heating purposes 
increased their consumption after the project implementation, because the electrical 
capacity was not enough to heat the building up to a normal condition. The reasons for the 
decrease can be explained by the consumers’ way of maintaining a decent temperature 
using additional electrical heating as a point source of the heat. After the project 
implementation the efficiency raised and the need for the additional heating decreased 
(Comarov P., interview on July 17, 2008).  
 
Figure 5-6 Heat consumption per project activity before project (2004), projected and 
after project 
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Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005; CFU, 
2006, 2007 
It should also be noted that the changes in the heat consumption depends largely on the 
financial capability of the public institution. The price for the natural gas increased by 45% 
in 2006 as opposed to projected 6% increase (ANRE, 2006). This fact could also to a large 
extent influence the consumption patterns in the buildings. Some of the buildings 
implemented demand-side energy efficiency measures outside the main project component, 
thus decreasing the total energy consumption of the building (Comarov P., interview on 
July 17, 2008). To conclude, if the useful consumption in the buildings decreases over 
time, this means either the energy users are trying to save on fuel decreasing the indoor 
temperature, or implement demand-side energy efficiency measures, like sealing of the 
windows and doors, and their useful consumption decreases with no decrease in the indoor 
temperature. 
5.2 Cost-revenue analysis 
The projected amount of the emissions for 2006 was 3801 t CO2 (due to that the 
implementation aof the PA6 was planned for 2006). The actual emissions after the project 
implementation constituted 3469 t CO2. If the works at PA6 were conducted according to 
the plan at the end of 2006, it would not generate emission reductions until 2007 and the 
figure for the actual emissions would be higher and constitute 4286 t CO2. Similarly, if not 
the implementation of the project at PA6, the emission reductions for the 19 PAs in 2006 
would be lower than projected due to the increased fuel consumption compared to the 
projected (CFU, 2006, 2007). 
 
Figure 5-7 Projected and actual emission reductions 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005; CFU, 
2006, 2007 
According to the design document the total discounted cost of the project over the crediting 
period would constitute 6 950 670 USD. This is 150 000 USD more than the planned 
baseline. The revenue from the CERs is expected based on a price of 5 USD/CER. This 
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would result in a positive discounted net benefit for the project owners of more than 197 
000 USD (UNFCCC, 2006; CFU and MEPIU, 2005).  
IRR for the project without the CERs revenue is 9.2%, with the CERs revenue 10.2%. 
Sutter (2001) stated that for the private investors IRR should be not lower than 15% 
(including the international transaction costs) to get involved in financing of a CDM 
project. The transaction costs are not included in the calculations, because they have been 
excluded for the given project due to the provisions of the CDCF. However, starting in 
2008, the project owners will pay 8% of their CERs revenue to the CFU Moldova for the 
monitoring activities (Braga D., interview on July 14, 2008). 
Table 5-1 Financial indicators for 27 PAs 
Financial index USD 
Total discounted project cost over the crediting period, USD 6 950 670  
Total discounted baseline cost of the service over the crediting period, USD 6 799 481 
Total project net benefit w/o CERs, USD -151 189 
Total discounted revenue from CERs, USD 347 068 
Total project net benefit w/ CERs, USD 197 315 
Cost of emission reduction, USD/t CO2 99.7 
Source: UNFCCC, 2006; CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
5.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
The registered average contracted price of the primary CERs in 2007 and early 2008 is 
approximately 13.6 USD, which is 24% higher than in 2006, while the minimum price is 
approximately 9 USD/t CO2 (WB, 2008). The growth in the CERs market price is 
connected to the oil price increase and the growing shortage of the CERs supply and 
therefore is expected to continue.  
While the contract price for the 1 tCO2 of the emissions reductions in the Moldova project 
has been stipulated at the level of 4.6 USD/tCO2, the reflection of the market price changes 
in the future revenue from the CERs trading depends on the possibility for the CFU to 
negotiate the contract price dynamics. Carbon finance funds at the World Bank (the 
Prototype Carbon Fund, the Community Development Carbon Find and the BioCarbon 
Fund) rarely offer a contract price for the CERs over 5 USD/t CO2, including a premium 
for the sustainability impact and taking into consideration the exclusion of all preparation 
costs from the total project cost (UNEP, 2004b). 
Assuming no other factor in the projected scenario changed but the CERs price, it is 
possible to see how the revenue stream from the emission trading changes and affects the 
project’s NPV. In reality the price of the CERs constitutes 4.6 USD/t CO2, only 0.4 
USD/tCO2 less than projected (CFU, 2007). At this price the project’s NPV reduces by 
14% (see Table 5-1). 
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Table 5-2 Financial indicators for 27 PAs at contract CER price 
Financial index USD 
Total discounted project cost over the crediting period, USD 6 950 670  
Total discounted baseline cost of the service over the crediting period, USD 6 799 481 
Total project net benefit w/o CERs, USD -151 189 
Total discounted revenue from CERs, USD 347 068 
Total project net benefit w/ CERs, USD 169 435 
Cost of emission reduction, USD/t CO2 99.7 
Source: UNFCCC, 2006; CFU and MEPIU, 2005; CFU, 2007 
The project breaks even (zero NPV with the CER revenue) at the CER price of 2.17 USD/t 
CO2. At the CER price of 4.6 USD/t CO2 as stipulated in the agreement with the CDCF 
(all other indicators remaining unchanged) the project breaks even with the average annual 
emission reductions of 5348 t CO2. 
Another big constraint to the realistic baseline modeling is the volatility of the fuel price. 
The Russian gas exporter started increasing the fuel price in 2006 by an average of 45% 
annually. This has not been foreseen in the baseline model. It is understood that such a 
discrepancy with the projected fuel price growth will negatively affect the project 
profitability. 
 
Figure 5-8 Dynamics of the natural gas import price and average tariff for final consumers 
Source: constructed based on data from ANRE, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a; Monitorul 
Oficial, 2006, 2008  
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Figure 5-9 Dynamics of the discounted (10%) fuel cost for 27 PAs based on increased 
natural gas tariff 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005; CFU, 
2006, 2007; ANRE 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a; Monitorul Oficial 2006, 2008 
According to Fig. 5-9 the spending on fuel would grow considerably due to the increase in 
the natural gas tariff, if the level of the heat consumption follows the baseline scenario. In 
reality, the energy consumption in 2006 (first year after project implementation) was higher 
than projected (see Fig. 5-2). The fuel consumption for the 19 beneficiaries was 
respectively higher than projected by approximately 260 thousand m3 of natural gas; the 
budget spent on the consumed amount of fuel was by 162 000 USD (135%) larger in 2006 
than planned for the 19 PAs (calculated based on the data from CFU and MEPIU, 2005; 
CFU, 2007).   
The price for the natural gas exported by the Russian company Gazprom to Europe is 
gradually increasing too. Recent press release by the Chief Executive of Gazprom Alexei 
Miller (Pravda, 2008) acknowledges a potential increase in the gas price for Europe to 
1000 – 1500 euro per thousand m3. According to Gazprom by 2011 the price for the natural 
gas exported to the Former Soviet Union countries, including Moldova, should reach the 
European market price (Socor, 2007). Therefore the annual increase of 45% does not look 
very ambitious for the next several years.  
This is how the financial indicators of the project change if the fuel price increase of the 
annual average 45% is introduced into the project cost for the whole crediting period 
(ceteris paribus): 
Table 5-3 Financial indicators for 27 PAs at 45% fuel cost increase 
Financial index USD 
Total discounted project cost over the crediting period, USD 20 463 126  
Total discounted baseline cost of the service over the crediting period, USD 6 799 481 
Total project net benefit w/o CERs, USD -13 663 645 
Total discounted revenue from CERs, USD 347 068 
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Total project net benefit w/ CERs, USD -13 315 141 
Cost of emission reduction, USD/t CO2 293.6 
Source: calculated and constructed based on data from UNFCCC, 2006; CFU and 
MEPIU, 2005; ANRE, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a; Monitorul Oficial, 2006, 2008 
If the data in the Table 5-3 reflected the real situation, the project beneficiaries would 
sharply reduce their fuel consumption in order to stay within the project budget. However, 
from the Fig. 5-2 we know that the heat consumption and the respective spending on it 
increased. This can be explained by the particularities of the method chosen by the project 
designers to demonstrate the investment additionality of the given CDM project. The 
method consists of a comparison of costs and does not include the revenue part of the 
project. It is assumed in such a method that the revenue stays the same for the baseline and 
project scenario. However, in the case of the Moldova CDM project, the revenue (heating 
budget) for the project scenario increased, as mentioned before, by 135%, allowing public 
buildings consume more energy, improve their living comfort and not increase their debt 
due to the increase in the gas tariff.  
Therefore, the investment additionality demonstration as well as the financial assessments 
of the project performance should be based on the comparison of the NPVs of the baseline 
and project scenarios, rather than solely the costs. 
5.2.2 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs have not been included in the cost-revenue analysis, because they were 
excluded from the total project cost. All transaction costs are borne by the WB CDCF, 
which carries out the trading of the CERs in the market, until 2008, when project owners 
start paying the monitoring costs to the CFU in amount of 8% of the CERs revenue (Braga 
D., interview on July 14, 2008).  
However, it might be interesting to see how comparable the transaction costs are with the 
expected revenue stream from the emission trading. According to Michaelowa et al (2002) 
the total transaction cost for a small scale project on the boiler conversion with the average 
emission reductions of 2000 – 20 000 t CO2/year constitute 10 euro/tCO2 (or around 15 
USD/t CO2). If the project owners were paying the transaction costs themselves (assumed 
ceteris paribus), this would increase the cost of the emission reduction to 107.9 USD/t CO2 
(discounted at 10% discount rate). The NPV of the project with the CERs will be negative: 
-374 542 USD.  
According to the estimates for the transaction costs provided by the Prototype Carbon Fund 
of the World Bank (PCF, 2003) the pre-implementation costs for small-scale projects 
constitute 110 000 USD, while post-implementation range between 7 000 – 20 000 USD. 
Assuming the project owners bear all transaction costs, the net present value of the project 
would be reduced down to 39 435 USD, with the respective cost of reducing 1 t CO2 equal 
to 101.6 USD. In 2008, the project owners are obliged to pay only monitoring costs, which 
constitute 8% of the CERs revenue, which would be equal to approximately 25 000 USD at 
the contract price of CERs for the whole crediting period. The cost of the emission 
reductions will grow up to 100 USD/t CO2 (calculations are based on data from CFU and 
MEPIU, 2005; UNFCCC, 2006).  
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The history of the CDM has not experienced so far a lot of projects targeting energy 
efficiency in public buildings. Therefore, there is yet a lack of practical studies addressing 
specific conditions under which the CDM projects in the public institutions are operating in 
the developing countries. 
The biggest uncertainty with the CDM lies in its assumptive nature. The CERs are issued 
based on a simple calculation of the difference between what might have been emitted if no 
project had taken place and what really was emitted after the project was implemented. In 
the project design, however, the project emissions are also estimated, raising the magnitude 
of the uncertainty. Thus the actual project performance evaluated ex-post may be different 
from what was expected in the ex-ante evaluation of the project results. The discrepancy 
between the estimated and the actual performance may affect the project’s contribution to 
the sustainability and the overall reasonability of the project implementation. 
My contribution consists of an analysis of a number of the most common barriers to the 
financial and environmental performance of an energy efficiency and fuel switch project in 
public buildings, with the view of its participation in the CDM; and an evaluation of the 
possible consequences for the ex-post results of the project compared to its development 
scenario constructed ex-ante. 
In order to know what to expect and what issues to address when designing a CDM project, 
a CDM project on energy efficiency and fuel switch in public buildings was taken as an 
illustrative example of an additional project in a sector rarely approved for participation in 
the CDM. This fact involves an interesting from the research point of view discussion of 
using the CDM as means to overcome significant barriers in implementation of the energy 
efficiency projects, especially in public buildings. At the same time the energy efficiency 
and fuel switch projects face a number of barriers and risks which are not always taken into 
account during the project design. Some barriers are specific to public buildings, which 
justifies the choice of the illustrative case study for the present research. Public buildings 
are also a very vulnerable sector in terms of their financial capability to implement projects 
that go beyond the business-as-usual.  
The last, but not the least point is the uniqueness of the project. The CDM pipeline 
includes only 9 projects in energy efficiency in buildings, among which only 5 are 
registered. Two of these projects comprise a bundle of a large number of buildings. Finally, 
only one of these projects is focused on the fuel switch besides energy efficiency and on the 
public buildings as a target sector – Moldova Energy Conservation and GHG Emission 
Reduction Project, which is the selected case study for the thesis.  
My findings (as qualitative assessments and tendencies, not precise quantitative estimates) 
can be extrapolated to other potential projects on fuel switch and energy efficiency in 
public buildings in Moldova and Former Soviet Union countries with a similar situation in 
the heating sector. Some of them, due to their common nature, can as well address private 
households and energy efficiency on the demand-side. For example, the rebound effect as a 
result of the suppressed energy demand and its impact on the greenhouse gas emission 
level can be addressed in any consumption sector, residential or public.  The increase in the 
fuel market price reduces the financial benefits of the improved efficiency for the fuel 
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switch projects, if the switch is from a cheaper to a more expensive fuel. On the other hand, 
for the demand-side energy efficiency measures the increase in the fuel price means an 
increase in the economic benefit. The volatility of the CERs price and variations in the 
composition and scale of the transaction costs bring uncertainty to the CDM project 
financing, evaluated in the present research. The only barrier specific for the public sector 
was the budgetary constraints, which are the consequence of a particular state policy on the 
public finance.  
The findings of the research can be used during the project design stage in order to take 
into account possible obstacles and benefits that may influence further project performance 
and ensure the project against underperformance. 
Energy efficiency projects in the developing countries often experience financial barriers. It 
is not always unavailability of funding, but more likely the weak financial status of the 
households, and especially budget institutions. Usually such beneficiaries can afford only 
loans under the very favorable conditions, like a long grace and reimbursement period, low 
interest, high subsidies, etc. Sometimes, the beneficiaries cannot meet the obligations for 
the own contribution, due to the shortage in the financial resources. Interviews with the 
experts of the Energy II Project revealed that some of the projects were delayed or refused 
due to inability of the municipalities to fulfill the requirement for the local contribution, 
such as infrastructure and engineering; although the degree of such contribution was 
reduced by the World Bank taking into consideration the financial constraints of the public 
institutions. Therefore, a claim of such projects as economically additional under the CDM 
is justified, even if they generate positive returns. However, the financial calculations 
should reflect the most likely scenario for justification, taking into consideration the most 
probable positive and negative effects of the market and non-market barriers on the 
baseline and project outcomes. 
The barriers to energy efficiency projects, as well as the barriers specific for the CDM 
projects, are starting to be addressed in the negotiations and research among the CDM 
experts. The recent invention to address the small-scale projects, and especially energy 
efficiency in buildings, includes the programmatic approach to CDM. Programmatic CDM 
assumes a program of activities, which is implemented in order to achieve certain goals at a 
large scale, e.g. enforcement of the national policy. The activities under the program can be 
implemented at different times, in different locations, even not necessarily in one country 
(Oppermann, 2005; Figueres and Philips, 2007). Such an approach gives much higher 
degree of flexibility to the project designers. For example, in the Moldova case study the 
unexpected drop-out of several PAs resulted in a loss of 51066 t CO2 of the potential 
emission reductions and a negative NPV for the project (CFU, 2006). More potential 
participants in the extended Energy II Project are identified; however, they cannot join the 
existing CDM project due to the procedural restrictions and need to be bundled into 
another project. Inability to expand the project activities at a later stage, when there is a 
need and demand for the project activities makes it necessary to apply for the registration 
of each bundle separately, incurring additional transaction costs. In case of the 
programmatic CDM it would be possible to add similar project activities, where the 
demand exists, at a later stage of the program implementation. This is called “the inclusion 
of the “long tail” projects”, meaning the multitude of the small-scale projects, which 
generate small emission reductions individually, but represent a high reduction potential 
altogether (Hinostroza, et al., 2007). Unfortunately, the programmatic CDM does not yet 
solve the problems of the weak methodologies, demonstration of the additionality and the 
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monitoring barriers. The baseline and additionality has to be proved at two levels, program 
and activity, thus, increasing the complexity of the procedure and costs for the information 
search and the development of the scenarios. Dispersed beneficiaries, with increased 
number and wider spread under the programmatic CDM, create monitoring challenges for 
the project managers. However, the more project activities apply for the programmatic 
approach, the more incentive is created to develop the standardized and simplified 
methodologies.  
The split incentive in the public buildings is closely related to the existing regulatory 
framework in the CDM host country. The split incentive barrier arising from the budgetary 
constraints and absence of the municipal autonomy is a general barrier to any investment 
project, preventing any kind of borrowing for the public institutions. Such constraints are 
quite common in many of the Eastern European countries, like Bulgaria, Albania, 
Macedonia, and FSU countries, like Ukraine and Moldova. Subsidies do not work 
effectively, if there is no long-term incentive to implement a project, which generates 
savings. If there is a regulatory constraint on the local control and use of the generated 
revenues, the revenues do not benefit the investors. On the other hand, budget constraints 
set limits on the sustainability targets of the respective investment projects: savings, which 
otherwise could be used for a better indoor comfort, needed procurement and/or 
reimbursement of loans, would be simply cut off of the budget revenue under the currently 
prevailing regulations in some of the developing countries. One of the ways to combat this 
barrier is the adoption of the best practice approaches developed by some other countries, 
previously experiencing limited investment flow into the energy efficiency in buildings. 
Examples are a revolving fund for the energy savings created in Bielsko Biala in Poland 
and the regulatory changes, like resolution addressing budget execution in Lviv, Ukraine 
(USAID, nd). 
The complexity and weakness of the existing methodologies is considered to be one of the 
biggest problems, needing an urgent address. Most of the barriers discussed in the present 
study are not considered by the standardized methodologies. For example, the suppressed 
demand barrier is difficult to overcome, if the baseline methodology does not allow a 
positive shift in the energy consumption. This leads to smaller or even negative emission 
reductions, making the project senseless from the point of view of the environmental 
additionality in the CDM. However, the increased energy consumption serves the 
sustainability goals of the CDM, which are sometimes prevailing over the emission 
reduction potential (IETA, 2006). The use of the standardized methodologies for small-
scale fuel switch projects do not foresee the energy consumption increase, thus no increase 
in the indoor temperature is foreseen. However, this is the main purpose of the majority of 
supply-side energy efficiency projects. The households with the suppressed demand remain 
excluded from the CDM or experience worse performance of their projects, if no 
suppressed consumption is foreseen to be addressed by the methodology. Therefore it is 
reasonable to consider a development of new standardized methodologies addressing the 
impact of the specific barriers, thus attracting more projects addressing some important 
economic and social issues. On the other hand, there is a certain limit of how complex the 
methodology can be. More complex methodologies trigger higher transaction costs and 
may ruin the potentially eligible project. A methodology should not address all 
uncertainties and each specific circumstance, rather provide acknowledgement of the 
barrier existence and propose thresholds or benchmarks to incorporate the uncertainty 
impacts into the project design. 
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The underperformance (in terms of the thermal comfort) of the supply-side efficiency in the 
case of the imposed limits on the fuel consumption can be diminished if the demand-side 
energy efficiency is addressed. Battell (nd, cited in USAID (nd) studied the impact of 29 
different investments on the CO2 emissions addressing different segments of the heating 
chain. The study proved that 1 million USD of investment in the end-use efficiency 
provides 3 times greater emission reductions than investments in the supply side. This can 
indicate that the supply-side investments may be made to increase the heat supply to 
consumers, rather than just for the energy efficiency purposes. It is obvious that savings on 
the supply-side are “wasted” on the demand-side if the building’s thermal efficiency is low. 
The demand-side energy efficiency can potentially reduce about 20-60% of the end-use 
energy (USAID, 2006). Such measures like replacement or sealing of windows and doors, 
wall and roof insulation are low-cost and are much more cost-effective than the supply-side 
due to their direct impact on the useful energy. The energy experts of the Energy II Project 
were also questioning the single-side approach used in the WB project; however, it was 
explained that demand-side energy efficiency measures “are not foreseen by the project” 
(Comarov P., interview, July 17, 2008). 
Fuel switch projects are risky due to the unstable market prices for fuel. A too high and 
unexpected rise in the natural gas price can make the project unprofitable even with the 
revenue from the CERs. The prices for the public organizations should be and most 
probably are adjusted, thus the revenue part of the budget will be adjusted to the costs, 
however, most likely not to the same extent, thus the budget might require a cut in the 
energy consumption. If so, it will increase the revenue from the CERs, but decrease the 
level of the comfort for the project beneficiaries, distorting the sustainability component of 
the project. More to that, if the prices are adjusted and the revenue increased, the financial 
calculations for the project should be adjusted to reflect the true cost of the fuel. Otherwise, 
the project will remain unprofitable. This is the case when the financial calculations for the 
justification of the economic additionality should not be based on the cost comparison 
(without considering the revenues), but instead compare NPVs for the respective baseline 
and project scenarios. The increasing prices for the fossil fuels should trigger the demand 
for the end-use energy efficiency solutions and cheaper local renewable fuels (e.g. baled 
straw in Moldova) (Gobjila, 2007). 
The same concerns the CERs prices or any other market variable. When the profitability 
and therefore implementation of the project depends on the market price of the CERs, it is 
a very unstable criterion. However, this is the main prerequisite for participation in the 
CDM. Lower prices may negatively affect the project’s economic performance, thus not 
fulfilling their role of creating the marginal revenue. The contracts with the fixed price for 
the CERs do not allow the project owners to benefit from the current increase in the CERs 
market price. On the other hand, the CDM projects, which have not yet started generating 
CERs, pose a risk for the CER buyers; therefore lower and fixed prices of the contracts 
contribute to the risk minimization for the CER purchasers, while creating an immediate 
benefit for the project owners. 
Transaction costs raise a big discussion among the CDM experts. It is not possible to avoid 
the transaction costs, but it is possible to reduce them. Small-scale projects are a very 
vulnerable group of the CDM projects, due to the high value of the transaction costs per ton 
of CO2 emission reductions. Already they are benefitting from the simplified 
methodologies, which may cost less, but this still does not address many of the important 
issues, as mentioned above. Different techniques, such as bundling and less often 
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verification are used to reduce the transaction costs. However, all of them have positive as 
well as negative effects. For example, bundling reduces the fixed costs, but complicates the 
monitoring procedure and the data collection. Simplification and standardization of the 
baseline and monitoring methodologies as well as additionality requirements could 
significantly reduce the pre-implementation transaction costs for the information, 
consulting, design and post-implementation monitoring. On the other hand, simplification 
should not undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM, creating a loose framework 
for the project eligibility. There is another barrier to the improved reliability and accurate 
verification of the project results: lack of the trained staff in the CDM organizational 
structure. This barrier limits the CDM capability to approve more and diverse projects for 
implementation and prolongs the timing for the registration, while more various projects 
are needed for implementation not only for their sustainability potential, but also for their 
ability to contribute to closing the knowledge gaps in the CDM operation.  
The cost risks should be minimized by a careful allocation of the cost obligations among 
the project participants and the CERs purchasers. The risk of the cost overrun and 
underperformance should be minimized by the stakeholder commitment and a close 
cooperation with the National CDM Authorities and financing parties on the action plan, 
budget execution and the overall project management, establishment of the transparent 
performance criteria and a careful monitoring and verification of the project progress. It 
should be noted that the development of a business model for the CDM incurs the need for 
an extensive capacity building for the project participants not only on the Kyoto Protocol 
and operation of the CDM, but also on the project and risk management. Much knowledge 
is needed for the investigation of the legal and contractual options for the risk allocation, 
development of new and more efficient mechanisms of securing the required level of the 
project performance. 
After the Kyoto Protocol entered into force there is less risk for the investors to remain 
without any reimbursement for the carbon credit. However, the CDM is a very young 
mechanism and there is still need for more experience and knowledge about the risks and 
uncertainties in the CDM projects. The more projects enter the pipeline, the more lessons 
are learned about how to handle these risks. The present research aimed at contributing to 
closing a knowledge gap on the uncertainties in the CDM financing arising from a number 
of market and policy conditions in a specific sector of energy efficiency in public buildings. 
This sector is extremely underrepresented in the CDM pipeline, although incurs significant 
economic and social benefits and a large potential for contributing to the Sustainable 
Development. The existing projects in energy efficiency in buildings need to be further 
studied on their real performance and the causes for their success or failure. A significant 
barrier in the CDM energy efficiency – transaction costs – is very specific for each 
individual project; therefore it is important that each case is studied individually on the 
composition and scale of transaction costs, their origin and possibilities for their reduction. 
Due to the fact that the main contributor to the transaction costs is the CDM project cycle 
itself, the research on the new and optimization of the existing methodologies can 
substantially foster positive transformations in the CDM modalities and procedures and 
contribute to promotion of the CDM in the sectors strategically important for the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development goals.  
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July 17, 2008 
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Appendix A 
Map of the Republic Moldova  
 
Source: UNFCCC, 2008c 
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Appendix B 
Project activities of Moldova CDM project and their main technical parameters  
Location Project Activity 
Public 
facilities 
Heated 
area,        
m2 
Heat 
demand 
kW 
PA forseen 
installed 
capacity, 
kW 
Fuel      
switching* 
Type of 
existing 
heating 
source 
Romanian 
school 5355 341 
PA1 
Kindergarten 
nr.3 3430 262 
723 1,4 to 3 Stove 
Russian 
school 2790 172 
Cantemir 
PA2 
Kindergarten 
nr.1 1250 76 
298 1,4 to 3 Stove 
PA3 Gimnazium No.5 3700 180 224 1,4 to 3 Boiler U5 
Kindergarten 
nr.5 1330 98 
Library 1440 77 PA4 
Center of arts 925 70 
294 1,4 to 3 Stove 
PA5 Kindergarten 
nr.10 4800 22 358 1,4 to 3 Stove 
PA6 District hospital+CFD 12000 640 1100 1 to 3 Boiler U5 
Făleşti 
PA7 Orphanage 10000 650 1044 1,4 to 3 Boiler U5 
Cultural 
center 
1554 20 
PA8 
City Museum 720 22 
140 E/e to 3 El. Heating 
Floreşti 
PA9 Center of arts 1862 100 190 E/e to 3 El. Heating 
PA10 Musical 
school 2389 120 280 E/e to 3 
El. 
Heating 
PA11 School nr.1 15040 300 570 1,4 to 3 Boiler U6 
PA12 Kindergarten 
nr.1 2000 50 50 1,4 to 3 Boiler U5 
Străşeni 
PA13 District hospital 6768 800 820 1,4 to 3 Boiler U5 
PA14 District hospital 22164 1700 2250 2 to 3 
Boiler 
KVGM 
PA15 Orphanage 7696 460 650 1 to 3 Boiler U5 Hânceşti 
PA16 Construction College 16800 217 500 1 to 3 Boiler U7 
Ialoveni PA17 
District 
hospital 9470 430 1070 E/e to 3 
El. 
Heating 
Uncertainties in financing Clean Development Mechanism projects 
61 
Nisporeni PA18 
District 
hospital 18946 800 1350 2 to 3 
Boiler 
KVGM 
PA19 Lev Tolstoi lyceum 9170 140 1000 1 to 3 Boiler U5 
Leova 
PA20 District hospital 12000 660 1200 1 to 3 
Boiler 
F09/1 
Cupcini PA21 Orphanage 7475 500 1160 1 to 3 Boiler U5 
Mărculeşti PA22 
Professional 
school 14600 620 1420 1 to 3 Boiler U5 
Drochia PA23 
Professional 
school 1460 380 600 E/e to 3 El. heating 
PA24 
Kindergarten 
nr.3+Resident
ial 3207 366 4000 2 to 3 
Boiler 
KVGM 
PA25 
Kindergarten 
nr.4+Resident
ial 2312 891 4000 E/e to 3 
El. heating 
PA26 
Medical 
college+Resi
dential 4197 329 2000 E/e to 3 
El. heating 
Ungheni 
PA27 Kindergarten 
nr.2+School 3207 256 1000 2 to 3 
Boiler 
KVGM 
* Type of fuels: 1 – coal; 2 – heavy fuel oil; 3 – natural gas; 4 – wood, e/e – electricity. 
Note: highlighted grey are the dropped out project participants 
Source: CFU and MEPIU, 2005 
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Appendix C 
Initial assumptions 
Indicator Explanation Value Units 
y Reference year for discounting 2004   
 Project cost 2 500 000 USD 
aL Annual loan repayment  406863 USD 
Pg Natural gas price 80 USD/1000 m3 
 Natural gas price annual growth rate 6 % 
r Discount rate 10 % 
OM O&M costs rate (as function of project cost) 6 % 
Ps Baseline energy service price for the reference 
year 26 USD/MWh 
 Baseline energy service price annual growth 
rate 1.5 % 
pCER GHG emission reduction price  4.6 USD/t 
kem Low heat value, Coal 5.556 kWh/kg 
kem Low heat value, Heavy fuel oil 10.746 kWh/kg 
kem Low heat value, Gas 9.306 kWh/m3 
kem Low heat value, Wood 2.941 kWh/m3 
 Crediting period 10 Years 
ke Emission factor, Coal 0.342 t/MWh 
ke Emission factor, Heavy fuel oil 0.278 t/MWh 
ke Emission factor, Gas 0.199 t/MWh 
ke Emission factor, Wood 0.305 t/MWh 
ηb2 New Gas Boiler Efficiency 92 %  
ηb1 Efficiency of the existent KVG boilers on 
natural gas 91 %  
ηb1 Electricity production efficiency at local power 
plants 30 % 
ηb1 Existent Coal fired Boiler Efficiency (U5 - U7) 60 % 
ηb1 Existent Boiler Efficiency (heat stove) 40 % 
ηb1 Existent Heavy fuel oil fired Boiler Efficiency 87 % 
ηn2 External network losses rate for new heating 
systems 98 % 
ηn1 Overall existing external network efficiency 90 % 
ηn1 Overall electrical network efficiency 80 % 
 Annual consumption growth rate (pessimistic 
value) 5    % 
 Electrical heating length 1800 Hours 
S Length of standard heating season 4350 Hours 
Source: CFU and MEPIU, 2005  
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Appendix D 
Calculations of the project indicators  
a) General 
Indicator Explanation Formula Units 
D Heat demand before project Primary data MW 
Wi Project installed capacity Primary data MW 
Vb Baseline quantity of fuel by type Primary data tones of coal, tones of 
heavy fuel oil, 
thousand m3 of natural 
gas, m3 of wood 
ηs1 Efficiency of the old system ηs1  = ηb1 * ηn1 % 
ηs2 Efficiency of the new system ηs 2 = ηb2 * ηn2 % 
Q Baseline final useful energy consumption = 
project final useful energy consumption 
Q = Vb * kem * ηs1 MWh 
Vp Project quantity of natural gas Vp = Q / ηs2 / kem thousand m3 
Eb Baseline emissions Eb = Vb * kem * ke tones CO2 e 
Ep project emissions Ep = Vp * kem * ke tones CO2 e 
ER project emission reductions ER = Eb - Ep tones CO2 e 
Source: UNFCCC, 2008c; UNFCCC, 2006  
b) Suppressed demand 
Indicator Explanation Formula Units 
Hn2 embodied heat needed to achieve full length 
heating season and normal temperature after 
project 
Hn2 = Wi * S 
(constant) 
 
MWh 
Hn1 embodied heat needed to achieve full length 
heating season and normal temperature 
before project 
Hn1 = Hn2 * ηs 2 * Hb / 
Qb (constant) 
 
MWh 
ESn Energy savings if no suppressed demand ESn = Hn1 – Hn2 MWh 
SD Suppressed demand SD = Hn1 – Vb * kem MWh 
Source: UNFCCC, 2008c; UNFCCC, 2006  
c) Standard levels of heat consumption (for consumption growth scenarios)  
Indicator Explanation Formula Units 
Qs Energy consumption needed to achieve full 
length of heating season 
Qs = D * S (constant) MWh 
Qn Energy consumption needed to achieve full 
length heating season and normal 
temperature 
Qn = Hn2 *  ηs2 MWh 
  Source: UNFCCC, 2008c; UNFCCC, 2006  
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d) Budgetary constraints 
Indicator Explanation Formula Units 
Hb Embodied heat for baseline energy 
consumption if no project 
Hb = Vb * kem MWh 
Hp Embodied heat for baseline energy 
consumption if project implemented 
Hp = Q / ηs2 MWh 
ES Energy savings ES = Hb - Hp MWh 
H1 Embodied heat consumption if no budget 
reduction 
H1 = Hp * ECb / ECp MWh 
E1 Emissions if no budget reduction E1 = H1 * ke t CO2e 
Source: UNFCCC, 2008c; UNFCCC, 2006  
e) Cost-revenue analysis 
Indicator Explanation Formula Units 
ECb Spending on energy service before project ECb = Ps * Q USD 
ECp Spending on energy service after project ECp = Vp * Pg + OM USD 
dECb Discounted baseline energy cost ∑ ECb * (1+r)-y USD 
dECp Discounted project energy cost ∑ (ECp+aL )* (1+r)-y USD 
NPV1 NPV without CERs NPV1 = dECb - dECp USD 
NPV2 NPV with CERs NPV2 = NPV1 + ∑ ER * 
pCER (1+r)-y 
USD 
Source: UNFCCC, 2008c; UNFCCC, 2006  
 
 
 
 
